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Abstract
We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible
object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that
are Pareto efficient, non-bossy, and implementable in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms. As
corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP-implementable fixed priority top trading
cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (2019) provides a
characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and
objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem where a set of objects are to be allocated over a set of individuals based on the
individuals’ preferences over the objects. Each individual can receive at most one object. An assignment
rule selects an allocation (of the objects over the individuals) at every collection of preferences of the
individuals.
Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, and strategy-proofness are standard properties of an assignment rule.
Pareto efficiency ensures that there is no other way to allocate the objects so that each individual is weakly
better-off (and hence some individual is strictly better-off). Non-bossiness says that an individual cannot
change the assignment of another one without changing her own assignment. Strategy-proofness en-
sures that no individual can be strictly better-off by misreporting her (true) preference. Group strategy-
proofness ensures the same for every group of individuals, that is, no group of individuals can be better-
off by misreporting their preferences. Here, we say a group of individuals is better-off if each member in
it is weakly better-off and some member is strictly better-off.
Li (2017) introduces the notion of obvious strategy-proofness for an assignment rule. This notion is based
on the notion of obvious dominance in an extensive-form game. A strategy si of an individual i in an
extensive-form game is obviously dominant if, for any deviating strategy s′i, starting from any earliest in-
formation set where si and s
′
i diverge, the best possible outcome from s
′
i is no better than the worst possible
outcome from si. An assignment rule is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if one can construct an extensive-
form game that has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. By construction, OSP depends on
the extensive-form game, so two games with the same normal form may differ on this criterion.1
The objective of this paper is to provide the structure of OSP-implementable assignment rules. We
impose two mild and desirable properties: Pareto efficiency and non-bossiness. First, we introduce
the notion of dual ownership for hierarchical exchange rule. Hierarchical exchange rules are introduced in
Pápai (2000) where it is shown that an assignment rule is strategy-proof, non-bossy, Pareto efficient, and
reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule. A hierarchical exchange rule works in
several stages. In every stage, the objects (available in that stage) are owned by certain individuals who
then trade their objects by forming top trading cycles.2 The ownership of the objects in any stage is deter-
mined by a collection of trees, which are called inheritance trees in Pápai (2000). A hierarchical exchange
rule satisfies dual ownership if for each preference profile and each stage of the hierarchical exchange rule
at that preference profile, there are at most two individuals who own all the objects available in that stage.
In this paper, we show that an assignment rule is OSP-implementable, Pareto efficient, and non-bossy if
and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying dual ownership (Theorem 7.1).
Although dual ownership is an intuitive and simple property (and thereby, is quite helpful for ex-
1This verbal description of obvious strategy-proofness is adapted from Li (2017).
2Top trading cycle (TTC) is due to David Gale and discussed in Shapley and Scarf (1974).
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plaining it to the participating individuals), it is not so convenient for the designer to check whether a
given hierarchical exchange rule satisfies this property or not. This is because, technically, one needs to
check at every preference profile and every stage of the hierarchical exchange rule at that preference profile,
whether at most two individuals are owning all the (available) objects in that stage or not. In view of this
observation, we introduce the notion of acyclicity for a hierarchical exchange rule. Acyclicity is a technical
property, which, as the name suggests, ensures that certain type of cycles are not present in the inher-
itance trees of a hierarchical exchange rule. The advantage of checking this property for a hierarchical
exchange rule is that it only involves the collection of inheritance trees, and not anything about the state
of the hierarchical exchange rule in different stages at different preference profiles. In Theorem 8.1, we
show that acyclicity and dual ownership are equivalent properties of a hierarchical exchange rule. It fol-
lows as a corollary (Corollary 9.1) of Theorem 7.1 that a hierarchical exchange rule is OSP-implementable
if and only if it satisfies dual ownership. In another corollary (Corollary 9.2) of Theorem 7.1, we show
that a trading cycles rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying
dual ownership. Trading cycles rules are generalization of hierarchical exchange rules. These rules are
introduced in Pycia and Ünver (2017) where it is shown that an assignment rule is strategy-proof, non-
bossy, and Pareto efficient if and only if it is a trading cycles rule. Note that since strategy-proofness and
non-bossiness together are equivalent to group strategy-proofness (see Pápai (2000) for details), all the
above-mentioned results can be reformulated in terms of group strategy-proofness.
The importance of OSP-implementability of an assignment rule is well-established in the literature. It
is observed that individuals do not seem to be convinced that a strategy-proof rule is indeed not manip-
ulable (Chen and Sönmez (2006), Hassidim et al. (2016), Hassidim et al. (2017), Rees-Jones (2018), Shorrer
and Sóvágó (2018)). Obvious strategy-proofness came to the literature as a remedy by strengthening
strategy-proofness in a way so that it becomes clear to the individuals that such a rule is not manipulable.
Troyan (2019) introduces the notion of weak acyclicity and shows that it is both necessary and suffi-
cient condition for an FPTTC rule to be OSP-implementable (Theorem 1 in Troyan (2019)).3 However,
there is a mistake in his characterization–although weak acyclicity is a sufficient condition for OSP-
implementability of an FPTTC rule, it is not necessary. Since FPTTC rules are special cases of hierarchical
exchange rules, we obtain as a corollary (Corollary 10.2) of our result that acyclicity is a necessary and
sufficient condition for OSP-implementability of an FPTTC rule. In another corollary (Corollary 10.1), we
obtain that an FPTTC rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it satisfies dual ownership.4 It is worth
mentioning that Troyan (2019) assumes that the number of individuals is the same as the number of ob-
jects, whereas we derive our results for arbitrary values of those.
As we have mentioned earlier, Pápai (2000) characterizes hierarchical exchange rules as the only as-
3Troyan (2019) uses the term “TTC rule“ to refer to an FPTTC rule in his paper.
4Theorem 2 in Troyan (2019) states that weak acyclicity and dual dictatorships are equivalent properties of an FPTTC
rule. This result is correct on its own, but because of the mistake in Theorem 1, it is not correct that an FPTTC rule is OSP-
implementable if and only if it satisfies dual dictatorships.
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signment rules satisfying strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, Pareto efficiency and reallocation-proofness.
Our results complement hers in two ways. Firstly, whereas strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and Pareto
efficiency are desirable, reallocation-proofness is not that desirable. So, replacing strategy-proofness and
reallocation-proofness by OSP-implementability, and characterizing the relevant class of hierarchical ex-
change rules is a significant contribution in our opinion. Secondly, hierarchical exchange rules are some-
what complicated for participants to understand. So, finding the class of such rules that can be imple-
mented by obviously strategy-proof mechanisms is important for their application. Nevertheless, OSP-
implementability is a desirable criteria on its own, and to our understanding, providing the structure of
such assignment rules is a significant contribution to the literature.
1.1 Related literature
Obvious strategy-proofness was introduced by Li (2017), who studies this property extensively for both
the scenarios where monetary transfers are allowed and not allowed. When monetary transfers are not
allowed, he analyses the implementability of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles rules under obvi-
ous strategy-proofness. Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) constructively characterize Pareto-efficient social
choice rules that admit obviously strategy-proof implementations in popular domains (object assignment,
single-peaked preferences, and combinatorial auctions). Pycia and Troyan (2019) characterize the full
class of obviously strategy-proof mechanisms in environments without transfer. They also introduce a
natural strengthening of obvious strategy-proofness called strong obvious strategy-proofness to character-
ize the well-known random priority mechanism as the unique mechanism that is efficient and fair. Ashlagi
and Gonczarowski (2018) consider two-sided matching with one strategic side. They show that for gen-
eral preferences, no mechanism that implements the men-optimal stable matching (or any other stable
matching) is obviously strategy-proof for men.
1.2 Organization of the paper
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce basic notions and notations that
we use throughout the paper. In Section 3, we define assignment rules and discuss their standard prop-
erties. Section 4 introduces the key notion of this paper: obvious strategy-proofness, Section 5 introduces
the notions of FPTTC rules and hierarchical exchange rules, and Section 6 introduces the dual owner-
ship property of a hierarchical exchange rule. We present our main result (characterization of all OSP-
implementable, Pareto efficient, and non-bossy assignment rules) in Section 7. Section 8 introduces the
acyclicity property of a hierarchical exchange rule. In Section 9, we present a characterization of OSP-
implementable hierarchical exchange rules and a characterization of OSP-implementable trading cycles
rules. In Section 10, we present two characterizations of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules and discuss the
relation between our results regarding FPTTC rules and that of Troyan (2019). In Section 11, we discuss
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the relation between hierarchical exchange rules satisfying dual ownership and sequential barter with
lurkers rules introduced in Bade and Gonczarowski (2017). Section 12 concludes the paper. All the proofs
are collected in the Appendix.
2 Basic notions and notations
For an arbitrary finite set X, we denote by L(X) the set of all linear orders (i.e., complete, asymmetric and
transitive binary relation) on X. An element of L(X) is called a preference over X. For a preference P, by
R we denote the weak part of P, i.e., for all x, y ∈ X, xRy if and only if
[
xPy or x = y
]
. For a preference P
over X and non-empty Y ⊆ X, we denote by τ(P, Y) the most preferred element of Y according to P, that
is, τ(P, Y) = y if and only if y ∈ Y and yPx for all x ∈ Y \ {y}.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a (finite) set of individuals and A be a (non-empty and finite) set of objects.
A function µ : N → A ∪ {∅} is called an allocation. Here, µ(i) = x for some element x of A means
individual i is assigned object x in allocation µ, and µ(i) = ∅ means individual i is not assigned any
object in µ. An allocation µ is feasible if no object is assigned to more than one individual. We denote by
M the set of all feasible allocations. For N̂ ⊆ N, Â ⊆ A such that |N̂| = |Â| 6= 0, we denote by M(N̂, Â)
the set of all feasible allocations of N̂ over Â, that is, M(N̂, Â) = {µ̂ | µ̂ is a bijection from N̂ to Â}. To
ease our presentation, for an allocation µ̂ ∈ M(N̂, Â), an individual i ∈ N̂, and an object x ∈ Â, we write
µ̂(x) = i whenever µ̂(i) = x.
We assume that the set of admissible preferences of each individual is L(A). For ease of presentation,
we denote τ(P, A) by τ(P) for a preference P. An element PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) of L
n(A) is called a preference
profile. Given a preference profile PN , we denote by (P
′
i , P−i) the preference profile obtained from PN by
changing the preference of individual i from Pi to P
′
i and keeping all other preferences unchanged.
For ease of presentation we use the following convention throughout the paper: for a set {1, . . . , g} of
integers, whenever we refer to the number g + 1, we mean 1. For instance, if we write st ≥ rt+1 for all
t = 1, . . . , g, we mean s1 ≥ r2, . . . , sg−1 ≥ rg, and sg ≥ r1.
3 Assignment rules and their standard properties
A function f : Ln(A) → M is called an assignment rule on Ln(A). For an assignment rule f : Ln(A) →
M and a preference profile PN ∈ L
n(A), we denote by fi(PN) the object that is assigned to individual i
by the rule f at PN .
An allocation µ Pareto dominates another allocation ν at a preference profile PN if µ(i)Riν(i) for all
i ∈ N and µ(j)Pjν(j) for some j ∈ N. An assignment rule f : L
n(A) → M is called Pareto efficient at a
preference profile PN ∈ L
n(A) if there is no feasible allocation that Pareto dominates f (PN) at PN , and it
is called Pareto efficient if it is Pareto efficient at every preference profile in Ln(A).
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Non-bossiness is a standard notion in matching theory which says that if an individual misreports her
preference and her assignment does not change by the same, then the assignment of any other individual
cannot change. Formally, an assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is non-bossy if for all PN ∈ L
n(A), all
i ∈ N, and all P̃i ∈ L(A), fi(PN) = fi(P̃i, P−i) implies f (PN) = f (P̃i, P−i).
5
An individual i manipulates an assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M at a preference profile PN ∈ L
n(A) via
a preference P̃i ∈ L(A) if fi(P̃i, P−i)Pi fi(PN). An assignment rule f : L
n(A) → M is strategy-proof if no
individual can manipulate it at any preference profile.
Group strategy-proofness says that no group of individuals will have an incentive to misreport their
preferences. More formally, a group of individuals N̂ ⊆ N manipulates an assignment rule f : Ln(A) →
M at a preference profile PN ∈ L
n(A) via a collection of preferences P̃N̂ ∈ L
|N̂|(A) if fi(P̃N̂ , P−N̂)Ri fi(PN)
for all i ∈ N̂ and f j(P̃N̂ , P−N̂)Pj f j(PN) for some j ∈ N̂. An assignment rule f : L
n(A) → M is group
strategy-proof if no group of individuals can manipulate it at any preference profile.
4 Obviously strategy-proof assignment rules
Li (2017) introduces the notion of obviously strategy-proof implementation. This notion is well-known in the
literature and needs no introduction. We use the following notions and notations to present this.
We denote a rooted (directed) tree by T. For a tree T, we denote its set of nodes by V(T), set of all
edges by E(T), root by r(T), and set of leaves (terminal nodes) by L(T). For a node v ∈ V(T), we denote
the set of all outgoing edges from v by Eout(v). For an edge e ∈ E(T), we denote its source node by s(e).
A path in a tree is a sequence of nodes such that every two consecutive nodes form an edge.
A leaves-to-allocations function ηLA : L(T) → M assigns a feasible allocation to each leaf of T, and a
nodes-to-individuals function ηNI : V(T) \ L(T) → N assigns an individual to each internal node of T. An
edges-to-preferences function ηEP : E(T) → 2L(A) \ {∅} assigns each edge a subset of preferences satisfying
the following criteria:
(i) for all distinct e, e′ ∈ E(T) such that s(e) = s(e′), we have ηEP(e) ∩ ηEP(e′) = ∅, and
(ii) for any v ∈ V(T) \ L(T),
(a) if there exists a path (v1, . . . , vt) from r(T) to v and some 1 ≤ r < t such that ηNI(vr) = ηNI(v)
and ηNI(vs) 6= ηNI(v) for all s = r + 1, . . . , t − 1, then ∪
e∈Eout(v)
ηEP(e) = ηEP(vr, vr+1), and
(b) if there is no such path, then ∪
e∈Eout(v)
ηEP(e) = L(A).
An extensive-form assignment mechanism is defined as a tuple G = 〈T, ηLA, ηNI , ηEP〉, where T is a
rooted tree, ηLA is a leaves-to-allocations function, ηNI is a nodes-to-individuals function, and ηEP is an
edges-to-preferences function.
5The concept of non-bossiness is due to Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
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Note that for a given extensive-form assignment mechanism G, every preference profile PN identifies a
unique path from the root to some leaf in T in the following manner: for each node v, follow the outgoing
edge e from v such that ηEP(e) contains the preference PηNI(v). If a node v lies in such a path, then we say
that the preference profile PN passes through the node v. Furthermore, we say two preferences Pi and P
′
i of
some individual i diverge at a node v ∈ V(T) \ L(T) if ηNI(v) = i and there are two distinct outgoing edges
e and e′ in Eout(v) such that Pi ∈ η
EP(e) and P′i ∈ η
EP(e′).
For a given extensive-form assignment mechanism G, the extensive-form assignment rule f G imple-
mented by G is defined as follows: for all preference profiles PN , f
G(PN) = η
LA(l), where l is the leaf that
appears at the end of the unique path characterized by PN .
In what follows, we define the notion of obvious strategy-proofness. This notion is introduced in Li
(2017).
Definition 4.1. An extensive-form assignment mechanism G is Obviously Strategy-Proof (OSP) if for all
i ∈ N, all nodes v such that ηNI(v) = i, and all PN , P̃N ∈ L
n(A) passing through v such that Pi and P̃i
diverge at v, we have f Gi (PN)Ri f
G
i (P̃N).
An assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is OSP-implementable if there exists an OSP mechanism G such
that f = f G.6,7
Remark 4.1. It is worth mentioning that every OSP-implementable assignment rule is strategy-proof (see
Li (2017) for details).
We present an example to illustrate the notion of OSP. This example is a modified version of Example
1 in Troyan (2019).
Example 4.1. Consider an allocation problem with three individuals {i, j, k} and three objects {x, y, z}.
In Figure 4.1, we provide an extensive-form assignment mechanism G.8 We claim that G is OSP. To see
this, consider, for instance, the preference profiles PN = (zxy, zxy, zxy) and P̃N = (zyx, xyz, zxy).
9 Note
that both of them pass through the node D at which Pj and P̃j diverge. Further note that f
G
j (PN) = z and
f Gj (P̃N) = x, which means G satisfies the OSP property for this instance. Similarly, one can check that G
satisfies the OSP property for other instances.
6Definition 4.1 is taken from Troyan (2019). However, his definition has a typo as it does not mention that PN and P̃N must
pass through v. We have corrected it here.
7An extensive-form assignment mechanism is called an OSP mechanism if it is OSP.
8We use the following notations in Figure 4.1: by (A : i) we mean that the node A is assigned to individual i, by xy we
denote the set of preferences where x is preferred to y, by xyz we denote the set of preferences where x is preferred to y and y is


























































5 Hierarchical exchange rules
The notion of hierarchical exchange rules is introduced in Pápai (2000). These rules are generalization of
fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, which we present in the next subsection.
5.1 FPTTC rules
FPTTC rules are well-known in the literature; we present a brief description for the sake of completeness.
First we explain the notion of a TTC procedure with respect to a given endowments of the objects over the
individuals. Suppose that each object is owned by exactly one individual. Note that an individual may
own more than one objects. A directed graph is constructed in the following manner. The set of nodes is
the same as the set of individuals. There is a directed edge from individual i to individual j if and only
if individual j owns individual i’s most preferred object. Note that such a graph will have exactly one
outgoing edge from every node (though possibly many incoming edges to a node). Further, there may be
an edge from a node to itself. It is clear that such a graph will always have a cycle. This cycle is called a
top trading cycle (TTC). After forming a TTC, the individuals in the TTC are assigned their most preferred
objects.
We are now ready to explain FPTTC rules. For each object x ∈ A, we define the priority of x as a
preference ≻x over the individuals in N. We denote the weak part of ≻x by x, that is, for all i, j ∈ N,
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i x j means either i ≻x j or i = j. We call a collection ≻A:= (≻x)x∈A a priority structure.
For a given priority structure ≻A, the FPTTC rule T
≻A associated with ≻A is defined by an iterative
procedure as follows. Consider an arbitrary preference profile PN ∈ L
n(A).
Step 1. Each object x is owned by the individual who has the highest priority according to ≻x, that is,
the most preferred individual of ≻x. TTC procedure is performed with respect to these endowments.
Individuals who are assigned some object leave the market with their assigned objects.
...
Step t. Consider the reduced market with the remaining individuals and objects. Each remaining object
x is owned by the individual who has the highest priority among the remaining individuals according
to ≻x, that is, the individual who is remained in the reduced market at this step and is preferred to
every other remaining individual according to ≻x. TTC procedure is performed on the reduced market
with respect to these endowments, and individuals who are assigned some object at this step leave the
market.10
...
This procedure is repeated iteratively until either all individuals are assigned or all objects are assigned.
The final outcome is obtained by combining all the assignments at all steps.
5.2 Description of hierarchical exchange rules
The key step that differentiates hierarchical exchange rules from FPTTC rules is the way how objects, that
were owned by an individual who is removed at a step, are passed down for the next step. In FPTTC
rule, each object has a fixed linear ordering (which we have called a priority) of the individuals, while
in hierarchical exchange rule, this is generalized to an inheritance tree, where the individual to whom
objects are passed can depend endogenously on the objects the previous owner is assigned.
The following verbal description of hierarchical exchange rules is taken from Pápai (2000). The allo-
cation obtained by a hierarchical exchange rule can be described by the following iterative procedure.
Individuals have an initial individual “endowment“ of objects such that each object is exactly one indi-
vidual’s endowment. It is important to note that some individuals may not be endowed with any objects.
Now apply the TTC procedure to this market with individual endowments. Notice that individuals who
don’t have endowments cannot be part of a top trading cycle, since nobody points to them, and therefore
they need not point. Given that multiple endowments are allowed, after the individuals in top trading
10In this TTC procedure, an individual i point to an individual j if j owns i’s most preferred object among the remaining
objects.
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cycles leave the market with their most preferred objects, unassigned objects in the initial endowment
sets of individuals who received their assignment may be left behind. These objects are reassigned as en-
dowments to individuals who are still in the market, that is, they are “inherited“ by individuals who have
not yet received their assignments. Furthermore, the objects in the initial endowment sets of individuals
who are still in the market remain the individual endowments of these individuals. Thus, notice that each
unassigned object is the endowment of exactly one individual who is still in the market. Now apply the
TTC procedure to this reduced market with the new endowments. Repeat this procedure until every indi-
vidual has her assignment or all the objects are assigned. Since there exists at least one top trading cycle in
every stage, this procedure leads to an allocation of the objects in a finite number of stages. In particular,
there are at most as many stages as there are individuals or objects, whichever number is smaller, since
in each stage at least one person receives her assignment. Furthermore, for any strict preferences of the
individuals, the resulting allocation is unique.
A hierarchical exchange rule is determined by the initial endowments and the hierarchical endowment
inheritance in later stages. While the initial endowment sets are given a priori, the hierarchical endow-
ment inheritance may be endogenous. In particular, the inheritance of endowments may depend on the
assignments made in earlier stages.
We explain how a hierarchical exchange rule works by means of the following example.
Example 5.1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. A hierarchical exchange rule is based on
a collection of inheritance trees, one tree for each object. We will define this notion formally; for the time
being we explain it through the current example. Figure 5.1 presents a collection of inheritance trees Γx1 ,
. . . , Γx4 . To understand their structure, let us look at one of them, say Γx1 . Each maximal path of this tree
has min{|N|, |A|} − 1 = 2 edges. In any maximal path, each individual appears at most once at the nodes.
For instance, individuals 1, 2 and 3 appear at the nodes (in that order) in the left most path of Γx1 . Each
object other than x1 appears exactly once at the outgoing edges from the root (thus there are three edges
from the root). For every subsequent node, each object other than x1, that has not already appeared in the
path from the root to that node, appears exactly once at the outgoing edges from that node. For instance,
consider the node marked with 2 in the left most path of Γx1 . Since object x2 has already appeared at the
edge from the root to this node, objects x3 and x4 appear exactly once at the outgoing edges from this
node. Thus, each object other than x1 appears at most once at the edges in any maximal path of Γx1 . For
instance, objects x2 and x3 appear at the edges (in that order) in the left most path of Γx1 . It can be verified


















































































Figure 5.1: Inheritance trees for Example 5.1
Consider the hierarchical exchange rule based on the collection of inheritance trees given in Figure 5.1.
We explain how to compute the outcome of the rule at a given preference profile. Consider the preference






Table 5.1: Preference profile for Example 5.1
The outcome is computed through a number of stages. In each stage, endowments of the individuals
are determined by means of the inheritance trees and TTC procedure is performed with respect to the
endowments.
Stage 1.
In Stage 1, the “owner“ of an object x is the individual who is assigned to the root-node of the inheri-
tance tree Γx. Thus, object x1 is owned by individual 1, objects x2 and x3 are owned by individual 2, and
object x4 is owned by individual 3.
Once the endowments of the individuals are decided, TTC procedure is performed with respect to the
endowments to decide the outcome of Stage 1. Individuals who are assigned some object in Stage 1 leave
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the market with the corresponding objects. It can be verified that for the preference profile PN given in
Table 5.1, individual 1 gets object x2 and individual 2 gets object x1 at the outcome of TTC procedure in
this stage. So, individuals 1 and 2 leave the market with objects x2 and x1, respectively.
Stage 2.
As in Stage 1, the endowments of the individuals are decided first and then TTC procedure is per-
formed with respect to the endowments. To decide the owner of a (remaining) object x, look at the root of
the inheritance tree Γx. If the individual who appears there, say individual i, is remained in the market,
then i becomes the owner of x. Otherwise, that is, if i is assigned an object in Stage 1, say y, then follow
the edge from the root that is marked with y. If the individual appearing at the node following this edge,
say j, is remained in the market, then j becomes the owner of x. Otherwise, that is, if j is assigned an
object in Stage 1, say z, then follow the edge that is marked with z from the current node. As before, check
whether the individual appearing at the end of this edge is remained in the market or not. Continue in
this manner until an individual is found in the particular path who is not already assigned an object and
decide that individual as the owner of x.
For the example at hand, the remaining market in Stage 2 consists of objects x3 and x4, and individual
3. Consider object x3. Individual 2 appears at the root of Γx3 . Since 2 is assigned object x1 in Stage 1, we
follow the edge from the root that is marked with x1 and come to individual 1. Since 1 is assigned object
x2, we follow the edge marked with x2 from this node and come to individual 3. Since individual 3 is
remained in the market, 3 becomes the owner of x3. For object x4, individual 3 appears at the root of Γx4
and she is remained in the market. So, 3 becomes the owner of x4 in Stage 2. To emphasize the process
of deciding the owner of an object, we have highlighted the node in red in the corresponding inheritance









































Figure 5.2: Stage 2
Once the endowments are decided for Stage 2, TTC procedure is performed with respect to the en-
dowments to decide the outcome of this stage. As in Stage 1, individuals who are assigned some object in
Stage 2 leave the market with the corresponding objects. It can be verified that for the current example,
individual 3 gets object x3 in this stage. So, individual 3 leave the market with objects x3.
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Stage 3 is followed on the remaining market in a similar way as Stage 2. For the current example,
everybody is assigned some object by the end of Stage 2 and hence the algorithm stops in this stage.
Thus, individuals 1, 2, and 3 get objects x2, x1, and x3, respectively, at the outcome of the hierarchical
exchange rule.
In what follows, we present a formal description of hierarchical exchange rules.
5.2.1 Inheritance trees
For a rooted tree T, the level of a node v ∈ V(T) is defined as the number of edges appearing in the
(unique) path from r(T) to v.




(i) Tx is a rooted tree with max
v∈V(Tx)
level(v) = min{|N|, |A|} − 1 and |Eout(v)| = |A| − level(v)− 1 for
all v ∈ V(Tx),
(ii) ζNIx : V(Tx) → N is a nodes-to-individuals function with ζ
NI
x (v) 6= ζ
NI
x (ṽ) for all distinct v, ṽ ∈
V(Tx) that appear in same path, and
(iii) ζEOx : E(Tx) → A \ {x} is an edges-to-objects function with ζ
EO
x (e) 6= ζ
EO
x (ẽ) for all distinct e,
ẽ ∈ E(Tx) that appear in same path or have same source node (that is, s(e) = s(ẽ)).
In what follows, we provide two examples (for two different scenarios) of inheritance trees.




















Figure 5.3: Example of Γx1











Figure 5.4: Example of Γx1
5.2.2 Endowments
A hierarchical exchange rule works in several stages and in each stage, endowments of individuals are
determined by using a (fixed) collection of inheritance trees.
Given a collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γx)x∈A, one for each object x ∈ A, we define a class of
endowments EΓ as follows:
(i) The initial endowment EΓi (∅) of individual i is given by
EΓi (∅) = {x ∈ A | ζ
NI
x (r(Tx)) = i}.
(ii) For all N̂ ⊆ N \ {i} and Â ⊆ A with |N̂| = |Â| 6= 0, and all µ̂ ∈ M(N̂, Â), the endowment EΓi (µ̂) of
individual i is given by
EΓi (µ̂) ={x ∈ A \ Â | ζ
NI
x (r(Tx)) = i, or
there exists a path (v1x, . . . , v
rx
x ) from r(Tx) to v
rx




x ) = i















5.2.3 Iterative procedure to compute the outcome of a hierarchical exchange rule
For a given collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γx)x∈A, the hierarchical exchange rule f
Γ associated with
Γ is defined by an iterative procedure with at most min{|N|, |A|} number of stages. Consider a preference
profile PN ∈ L
n(A).
Stage 1.
Hierarchical Endowments (Initial Endowments): For all i ∈ N, E1(i, PN) = E
Γ
i (∅).
Top Choices: For all i ∈ N, T1(i, PN) = τ(Pi).
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{j1, . . . , jg} if there exist j1, . . . , jg ∈ N such that
for all s = 1, . . . , g, T1(js, PN) ∈ E1(js+1, PN), and
for some ŝ = 1, . . . , g, jŝ = i;
∅ otherwise.
Since each individual can be in at most one trading cycle, S1(i, PN) is well-defined for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore, since both the number of individuals and the number of objects are finite, there is always at
least one trading cycle. Note that S1(i, PN) = {i} if T1(i, PN) ∈ E1(i, PN).
Assigned Individuals: W1(PN) = {i | S1(i, PN) 6= ∅}.
Assignments: For all i ∈ W1(PN), f
Γ
i (PN) = T1(i, PN).
Assigned Objects: F1(PN) = {T1(i, PN) | i ∈ W1(PN)}.










Fu(PN). In what follows, we present Stage t + 1 of f
Γ.
...
Stage t + 1.
Hierarchical Endowments (Non-initial Endowments): Let µt ∈ M(Wt(PN), F
t(PN)) such that for all i ∈
Wt(PN),
µt(i) = f Γi (PN).




Top Choices: For all i ∈ N \ Wt(PN), Tt+1(i, PN) = τ(Pi, A \ F
t(PN)).





{j1, . . . , jg} if there exist j1, . . . , jg ∈ N \ W
t(PN) such that
for all s = 1, . . . , g, Tt+1(js, PN) ∈ Et+1(js+1, PN), and
for some ŝ = 1, . . . , g, jŝ = i;
∅ otherwise.
Assigned Individuals: Wt+1(PN) = {i | St+1(i, PN) 6= ∅}.
Assignments: For all i ∈ Wt+1(PN), f
Γ
i (PN) = Tt+1(i, PN).
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Assigned Objects: Ft+1(PN) = {Tt+1(i, PN) | i ∈ Wt+1(PN)}.
...
This procedure is repeated iteratively until either all individuals are assigned or all objects are assigned.
The hierarchical exchange rule f Γ associated with Γ is defined as follows. For all i ∈ N,




Tt(i, PN) if i ∈ Wt(PN) for some stage t;
∅ otherwise.
Since for every preference profile PN and every individual i, there exists at most one stage t such that
i ∈ Wt(PN), f
Γ is well-defined.
Remark 5.1. Note that a collection of inheritance trees do not uniquely identify a hierarchical exchange
rule. More formally, two different collections of inheritance trees Γ and Γ may give rise to the same
hierarchical exchange rule, that is, f Γ ≡ f Γ.
6 Dual ownership
Troyan (2019) introduces the notion of dual dictatorships in the context of FPTTC rules.11 We introduce a
closely related notion for hierarchical exchange rules which we call dual ownership. This property plays
a key role in our characterization result. A hierarchical exchange rule satisfies dual ownership if for any
preference profile and any stage of the hierarchical exchange rule at that preference profile, there are at
most two individuals who own all the objects remained in the reduced market in that stage. Clearly, to
ensure dual ownership in Stage 1 of a hierarchical exchange rule, we must have at most two individuals
at the root-nodes of the inheritance trees of the hierarchical exchange rule. For instance, individuals 1,
2, and 3 own objects x1, x2, and x4, respectively, in Stage 1 of the hierarchical exchange rule in Example
5.1, and consequently, the hierarchical exchange rule in this example does not satisfy dual ownership. In
what follows, we present an example to illustrate the notion of dual ownership.
Example 6.1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Figure 6.1 presents a collection of inheri-
tance trees Γ.


































































































































Figure 6.1: Inheritance trees for Example 6.1
Consider the hierarchical exchange rule based on these collection of inheritance trees and consider the
preference profile PN given in Table 6.1.
P1 P2 P3 P3
x2 x1 x3 x2
x1 x2 x4 x3
x3 x4 x2 x1
x4 x3 x1 x4
Table 6.1: Preference profile PN for Example 6.1
In Stage 1, individual 1 owns the objects x1 and x2, and individual 4 owns the objects x3 and x4. At
then end of this stage, individual 1 gets object x2 and leaves the market with it.
In Stage 2, individual 4 owns the objects x1, x3 and x4. At the end of this stage, individual 4 gets object
x3 and leaves the market with it.
After Stage 2, there are only 2 individuals remained in the reduced market and dual ownership cannot
be violated. This concludes that the hierarchical exchange rule under consideration satisfies dual own-
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ership at the preference profile given in Table 6.1. Note that this does not ensure the dual ownership
property of the hierarchical exchange rule, as for that one needs to check the property at every preference
profile.12
It should be noted from Example 6.1 that although dual ownership is an intuitive and simple property,
it is somewhat time consuming to check whether a given hierarchical exchange rule satisfies this property.
This is because, technically, one needs to check at every preference profile whether at most two individ-
uals are owning all the (remaining) objects in every stage of the hierarchical exchange rule. In view of
this observation, we will present an equivalent property called acyclicity in Section 8 which involves the
inheritance trees only (and not preference profiles), and thus, is much easier to be checked.
6.1 Advantage of using hierarchical exchange rules satisfying dual ownership property
As mentioned in Troyan (2019), use of FPTTC rules in practice is rare in school choice environments as
participating individuals find it difficult to understand these rules (particularly the fact that these rules
are indeed strategy-proof, even though they are so in theoretical level). Hierarchical exchange rules are
generalizations of FPTTC rules, and consequently, suffer from the same problem. However, as we explain
in the following, when the dual ownership property is imposed on a hierarchical exchange rule, this
problem reduces considerably.
In what follows, we present how a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying the dual ownership property
can be explained to the participating individuals and how the explanation helps in convincing individuals
that such rules are indeed strategy-proof.13
In Stage 1:
(1) We call at most two individuals who will be the owners in this stage.
(2) We tell them their endowed sets.
(3) We tell them that each of them can “take“ something from her endowed set (and leave the market),
or “wait“ to see if she gets something better. We additionally mention that if someone chooses to
“wait“, she can leave the market anytime in the future with an object from her current endowment
set.
To see that the owners will act truthfully in (3), first note that the owners are asked to choose between
“take“ or “wait“, in particular, they are not asked to reveal their top choices. Therefore,
(a) if any of the owners has her favorite object in her endowment, then she will “take” that object
and leave the market, and
12The current hierarchical exchange rule indeed satisfies dual ownership at every preference profile.
13This explanation does not highlight many of the key features of hierarchical exchange rules satisfying the dual ownership
property.
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(b) if any of the owners does not have her favorite object in her endowment, then she will “wait”
as she can leave the market anytime in the future with an object from her current endowment
set.
(4) (i) If any of the owners chooses to “take“ in (3). We get a submarket.
(ii) On the other hand, if both of them choose to “wait“, we tell each of them to “take“ something
from other’s endowment and leave the market, and again we get a submarket. Clearly, there is
no question of manipulation for an individual at this step as she will simply take her favorite
object from other’s endowment.
In Stage 2:
(1) We call at most two individuals who will be the owners in this stage. If one of the owners in Stage
1 remains in the reduced market in Stage 2, we make her one of the owners in Stage 2.14
(2) We tell them their endowed sets. If one of the owners in Stage 2 was also an owner in Stage 1, all
the objects in her endowment in Stage 1 must be included in her endowment in Stage 2.
(3) Same as Stage 1. For the same reason as we have discussed in (3) of Stage 1, individuals will act
truthfully at this step of Stage 2.
(4) Same as Stage 1.
We continue this procedure until everyone is assigned or all objects are assigned.
The main reason why a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying dual ownership is simpler than an ar-
bitrary hierarchical exchange rule is as follows. The dual ownership property ensures that at most two
individuals will get to act in each stage. This makes it very simple for them to trade: they only in-
terchange their favorite objects. In contrast, for an arbitrary hierarchical exchange rule, there might be
arbitrary number of individuals trading their favorite objects in a stage, which makes it harder to asses
what would happen if they do not do this truthfully.
7 A characterization of OSP-implementable assignment rules
In this Section, we provide a characterization of OSP-implementable assignment rules under two mild
and desirable properties, namely Pareto efficiency and non-bossiness.
Theorem 7.1. An assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is OSP-implementable, Pareto efficient and non-bossy if and
only if f is a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying dual ownership.
14Note that both owners in Stage 1 can not remain in the reduced market in Stage 2.
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The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix B; here we provide an outline of it. We use the
following two results of Pápai (2000) in the proof of Theorem 7.1: (i) strategy-proofness and non-bossiness
together are equivalent to group strategy-proofness (Lemma 1 in Pápai (2000)), and (ii) an assignment rule
is group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange
rule (main theorem in Pápai (2000)). The proof of Theorem 7.1 is structured as follows.
We show that a hierarchical exchange rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it satisfies dual owner-
ship (Lemma B.1). Note that this result features as Corollary 9.1 in our paper. Lemma B.1, together with
the mentioned results of Pápai (2000), completes the proof of the “if“ part of Theorem 7.1.
To prove the “only if” part of Theorem 7.1, we show that every OSP-implementable, non-bossy and
Pareto efficient assignment rule is reallocation-proof (Lemma B.2). Since OSP is stronger than strategy-
proofness (Remark 4.1), Lemma B.2, together with the mentioned results of Pápai (2000), implies that
every OSP-implementable, non-bossy and Pareto efficient assignment rule is an OSP-implementable hi-
erarchical exchange rule. Together with Lemma B.1, this completes the proof of the “only-if“ part of
Theorem 7.1.
Since OSP-implementability implies strategy-proofness (see Remark 4.1) and group strategy-proofness
is equivalent to strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (see Pápai (2000) for details), we obtain the follow-
ing corollary from Theorem 7.1.
Corollary 7.1. A group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is OSP-implementable
if and only if f is a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying dual ownership.
It is worth mentioning that OSP-implementability and non-bossiness together do not imply Pareto
efficiency. For instance, any constant assignment rule satisfies the former two properties, but does not
satisfy the latter. Furthermore, it follows from Pápai (2000) that non-bossiness and Pareto efficiency to-
gether do not imply strategy-proofness. Since OSP-implementability is stronger than strategy-proofness
(by Remark 4.1), non-bossiness and Pareto efficiency cannot imply it either. Example 7.1 shows that OSP-
implementability and Pareto efficiency together do not imply non-bossiness.
Example 7.1. Consider an allocation problem with three individuals N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects A =





Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3) if x2P1x3
Serial dictatorship with priority (1 ≻ 3 ≻ 2) if x3P1x2
Consider the preference profiles PN = (x1x2x3, x1x2x3, x1x2x3) and P̃N = (x1x3x2, x1x2x3, x1x2x3).
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Note that only individual 1 changes her preference from PN to P̃N . This, together with the facts f (PN) =
[(1, x1), (2, x2), (3, x3)] and f (P̃N) = [(1, x1), (2, x3), (3, x2)], implies f is not non-bossy. However, the OSP
15Here, we denote by (x1x2x3, x2x3x1, x3x2x1) a preference profile where individuals 1, 2 and 3 have preferences x1x2x3,
x2x3x1, and x3x2x1, respectively.
20
mechanism in Figure 7.1 implements f .16 This, in particular, means that f is OSP-implementable. Also, it










































Figure 7.1: Tree Representation for Example 7.1
8 Acyclicity: equivalent to dual ownership
In this section, we introduce a property, called acyclicity, of a collection of inheritance trees and show
that it is equivalent to the dual ownership property of the corresponding hierarchical exchange rule. A
collection of inheritance tress is acyclic if they do not have any inheritance cycle. The notion of inheritance
cycle is somewhat involved, so we begin with a verbal description of the same.17 We have extended that
idea for an inheritance cycle in a collection of inheritance trees. We use the following terminologies to
facilitate the description (and the subsequent definitions). A path in an inheritance tree is called a root-
path if it starts from the root of the inheritance tree. We use the notation πx to denote a root-path in
an inheritance tree Γx. For ease of presentation, sometimes we represent a root-path by the sequence of
node-assignments and edge-assignments in it. For instance, we denote by i4 x5 i5 x4 i1 a root-path that
starts at the root-node to which individual i4 is assigned, follows the edge to which object x5 is assigned
and goes to the node assigned to individual i5, then follows the edge assigned to object x4 and goes to the
node assigned to individual i1. For an individual i in a root-path πx, we say individual i lies in the interior
of πx, if individual i is not assigned to the last node of πx. For instance, individuals i4 and i5 lie in the
interior of the aforementioned path.
16Apart from the notations that we have already introduced in this paper, we use the following notation in Figure 7.1: the







17The notion of an inheritance cycle becomes simpler if we consider a priority structure in place of a collection of inheritance
trees. In Section 10.2, we provide an intuitive explanation of the same.
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A tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] where i1, i2, i3 ∈ N and x1, x2, x3 ∈ A are all distinct, can constitute an
inheritance cycle in two ways. In the first way, individual ih is assigned to the root-node of Γxh for all
h = 1, 2, 3. To explain the second way, let us present a specific instance where individuals i1, i2, i3 and
objects x1, x2, x3 form an inheritance cycle. Suppose there exist distinct individuals i4, i5, i6 ∈ N \ {i1, i2,
i3}, distinct objects x4, x5, x6 ∈ A \ {x1, x2, x3}, and a feasible allocation µ̂ of {i4, i5, i6} over {x4, x5, x6},
say
µ̂(i4) = x5, µ̂(i5) = x4, and µ̂(i6) = x6.
For h = 1, . . . , 6, let πxh be a root-path in Γxh as given below.
πx1 : i4 x5 i5 x4 i1
πx2 : i6 x6 i5 x4 i2
πx3 : i4 x5 i3
πx4 : i6 x6 i4
πx5 : i6 x6 i5
πx6 : i6
Note that this collection of root-paths satisfies the following properties.
(i) (a) For all h = 1, . . . , 6, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual ih and the other individ-
uals in πxh are from the set {i4, i5, i6}. For instance, consider the root-path πx1 . The last element
is individual i1 and the other individuals are i4 and i5.
(b) For all h = 4, 5, 6, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths in
(πxh)h∈{1,...,6}, then object µ̂(ih) is assigned to that edge. For instance, there is an edge from
individual i4 in the paths πx1 and πx3 , and the object x5 (which is µ̂(i4)) is assigned to all these
edges.
(ii) For all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, x5, x6}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path πxj ,
then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi . For instance, µ̂(x6) = i6 lies in the interior of
the root-path πx4 , and hence, µ̂(x4) = i5 does not lie in the root-path πx6 .
In this case, the tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is called an inheritance cycle. In general, a tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1,
x2, x3)] is an inheritance cycle if one can get hold of individuals {i4, . . . , it}, objects {x4, . . . , xt}, a feasible
allocation µ̂, and a collection of paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t} satisfying properties as stated above. In what follows,
we present a formal definition.
Definition 8.1. A tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)], where i1, i2, i3 ∈ N and x1, x2, x3 ∈ A are all distinct, is
called an inheritance cycle in a collection of inheritance trees Γ if either individuals i1, i2, and i3 are
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assigned to the root-nodes of Γx1 , Γx2 , and Γx3 , respectively, or there exist distinct individuals i4, . . . ,
it ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3}, distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x1, x2, x3}, an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4,
. . . , xt}), and a collection of root-paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t} with the properties that
(i) (a) for all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual ih and the other individuals
in πxh are from the set {i4, . . . , it},
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths in
(πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̂(ih) is assigned to that edge, and
(ii) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path πxj ,
then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi .
We call a collection of inheritance trees acyclic if it contains no inheritance cycles, and call a hierarchical
exchange rule acyclic if it is based on an acyclic collection of inheritance trees.
Our next theorem says that acyclicity and dual ownership are equivalent properties of a hierarchical
exchange rule.
Theorem 8.1. A hierarchical exchange rule satisfies dual ownership if and only if it is acyclic.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix A.
9 OSP-implementability of hierarchical exchange rules and trading cycles
rules
In this section, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a hierarchical exchange rule and a
trading cycles rule to be OSP-implementable.
Corollary 9.1. A hierarchical exchange rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it satisfies dual ownership.
We prove this corollary as a part of the proof of Theorem 7.1 (see Lemma B.1).
Pycia and Ünver (2017) introduce a general version of hierarchical exchange rules which they call
trading cycles rules. They show that an assignment rule is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient if
and only if it is a trading cycles rule. Combining this result with Corollary 7.1, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 9.2. A trading cycles rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying
dual ownership.
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10 OSP-implementability of FPTTC rules
In this section, we consider FPTTC rules and investigate when such assignment rules are OSP-implementable.
FPTTC rules are special cases of hierarchical exchange rules when the collection of inheritance trees sat-
isfies a property, which we call the priority property (see Pápai (2000) for details).18 In what follows, we
present the definition of the priority property and explain how this property induces a priority structure
for an FPTTC rule.
A collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γx)x∈A satisfies the priority property if for all x ∈ A and all
v, ṽ ∈ V(Tx) with level(v) = level(ṽ), we have ζNIx (v) = ζ
NI
x (ṽ). We provide an example of a collection of
inheritance trees Γ that satisfies the priority property.
Example 10.1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and A = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Consider the collection of inheritance
trees given in Figure 10.1. To see that the collection satisfies the priority property, consider one inheritance
tree from the collection, say Γx1 . Note that individual 1 is assigned to the root-node of Γx1 , individual
2 is assigned to all nodes of Γx1 with level 1, individual 3 is assigned to all nodes of Γx1 with level 2,
and individual 4 is assigned to all nodes of Γx1 with level 3. Similarly, it can be verified for any other
inheritance tree that the same individual is assigned to all the nodes with a given level.
18Pápai (2000) uses the term “fixed endowment hierarchical exchange rule“ to refer to the hierarchical exchange rule associated


































































































































Figure 10.1: Γ with priority property
We now explain how for each x ∈ A, a preference ≻x over N can be constructed based on a collection of
inheritance trees Γ that satisfies the priority property. For ease of presentation, by the level of an individual i
in Γx, we mean the level of a node in Γx where i is assigned. Note that this is well-defined since Γ satisfies
the priority property. Define the level of an individual in Γx who does not appear in Γx as |A|.
For each x ∈ A, let ≻̂x be a preference over N such that i≻̂x j if the level of i is less than that of j. Note
that such a preference ≻̂x is not unique since it does not specify the relative ranking of the individuals
who do not appear in Γx. We say that the priority structure ≻̂A := (≻̂x)x∈A is induced by Γ. Clearly, the
induced priority structure need not be unique. In Table 10.1 we present one induced priority structure of
the collection of inheritance trees presented in Example 10.1 (Figure 10.1).
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Px1 Px2 Px3 Px4
1 2 2 3
2 5 1 4
3 1 4 5
4 3 5 1
5 6 3 6
6 4 6 2
Table 10.1: One induced priority structure of the collection of inheritance trees in Example 10.1 (Figure
10.1)
10.1 Counter example of Theorem 1 in Troyan (2019)
Troyan (2019) deals with the case where there are equal number of individuals and objects, i.e., |N| = |A|.
Theorem 1 of his paper says that an FPTTC rule is OSP-implementable if and only if the priority structure
satisfies a property called weak acyclicity. In this subsection, we provide a counter example to this theorem.
For ease of presentation, for a preference P over a set X and two subsets Y and Z of X, we write YPZ
to mean that each element of Y is preferred to each element of Z, that is, yPz for all y ∈ Y and all z ∈ Z.
Definition 10.1. (Troyan, 2019) A priority structure ≻A is said to have a strong cycle if there are three
objects x, y, z ∈ A and three individuals i, j, k ∈ N such that i ≻x {j, k}, j ≻y {i, k}, and k ≻z {i, j}. If ≻A
contains no strong cycles, then we say ≻A is weakly acyclic.
In what follows, we present an example to show that an FPTTC rule can be OSP-implementable even
if the priority structure has a strong cycle.19
Example 10.2. Consider an allocation problem with four individuals N = {i, j, k, l} and four objects
A = {w, x, y, z}. Let ≻A be as follows:
≻w ≻x ≻y ≻z
i i l l
j j j k
k k k j
l l i i
Table 10.2: Priority structure for Example 10.2
19Note that this contradicts the “only-if“ part Theorem 1 in Troyan (2019). In order to prove this part, Troyan (2019) considers
an arbitrary priority structure ≻A with a strong cycle with x, y, z ∈ A and i, j, k ∈ N such that i ≻x {j, k}, j ≻y {i, k}, and
k ≻z {i, j}. To show that the FPTTC rule T≻A is not OSP-implementable, he reduces the whole problem to a restricted domain
and uses a result from Li (2017). However, for the purpose of Troyan (2019), this reduction step is not correct.
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Note that i ≻x {j, k}, j ≻y {i, k}, and k ≻z {i, j}, which means there is a strong cycle in ≻A. However,
the OSP mechanism in Figure 10.2 shows that T≻A is OSP-implementable.20
20Apart from the notations we have already introduced, we use the following notations in Figure 10.2: by x{y, z} we denote





















































































































































































































































































































Figure 10.2: Tree representation of T≻A in Example 10.2
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10.2 Characterizations of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules
As we have mentioned, Troyan (2019) deals with the case where |N| = |A|. In this subsection, we consider
arbitrary values of |N| and |A| and provide two characterizations of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules for,
one using the dual ownership property and the other using the acyclicity property.
Since FPTTC rules are special cases of hierarchical exchange rules, the dual ownership property of
FPTTC rules implies the following: for any preference profile and any step of the FPTTC rule at that
preference profile, there are at most two individuals who own all the objects remained in the reduced
market at that step. Thus, we obtain the following corollary from Corollary 9.1.
Corollary 10.1. An FPTTC rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it satisfies dual ownership.
Next, we explain the implication of the acyclicity property for a priority structure and present a correct
version of Theorem 1 in Troyan (2019) (in fact, we present a general result for arbitrary values of |N| and
|A|).
We explain the reduced form of acyclicity when a collection of inheritance trees is reduced to a priority
structure. We use the following terminologies to facilitate the explanation (and the subsequent defini-
tions). For a preference ≻∈ L(N) and an individual i ∈ N, by U(i,≻) we denote the (strict) upper
contour set {j ∈ N | j ≻ i} of i at ≻. Following our notational convention, we write τ(≻) to denote the
most preferred individual according to ≻.
When we deal with a priority structure (in place of a collection of inheritance trees), the implication of
an inheritance cycle becomes simpler. We call it a priority cycle. The purpose of a priority cycle in a priority
structure is to make the corresponding FPTTC rule not OSP-implementable. By Corollary 10.1, this can
be done by making the corresponding FPTTC rule violate the dual ownership property. An FPTTC rule
violates the dual ownership property if there exists a preference profile and a step of the FPTTC rule at
that preference profile such that there are at least three owners at that step. Suppose individuals i1, i2, and
i3 own objects x1, x2, and x3, respectively, at Step s for some s. If s = 1, then it has to be that i1, i2, and i3 are
the most preferred individuals of ≻x1 , ≻x2 , and ≻x3 , respectively. If s > 1, then one necessary condition
for making i1, i2, and i3 the owners of x1, x2, and x3, respectively, at Step s, is that all the individuals in the
sets U(i1,≻x1), U(i2,≻x2), and U(i3,≻x3) are assigned before Step s. A part of the definition of priority
cycle captures this necessary condition. Note that ensuring that the individuals in U(i1,≻x1), U(i2,≻x2),
and U(i3,≻x3) are assigned before Step s is not sufficient to ensure that i1, i2, and i3 will be the owners of
x1, x2, and x3, respectively, at Step s. The definition of priority cycle captures the additional requirements
for this.
A tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] where i1, i2, i3 ∈ N and x1, x2, x3 ∈ A are all distinct, constitutes a priority
cycle in two ways. In the first way, ih is the most preferred individual of ≻xh for all h = 1, 2, 3. As we
have done in case of an inheritance cycle, let us explain the second way with a specific instance where
individuals i1, i2, i3 and objects x1, x2, x3 form a priority cycle. Suppose there exist distinct individuals
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i4, i5 ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3} and distinct objects x4, x5 ∈ A \ {x1, x2, x3}. For h = 1, . . . , 5, let ≻xh be as given
below (the dots indicate that all preferences for the corresponding parts are irrelevant and can be chosen
arbitrarily).
≻x1 ≻x2 ≻x3 ≻x4 ≻x5
i4 i4 i4 i5 i5






Table 10.3: Priority structure with a priority cycle
The priority structure in Table 10.3 has the property that for all h = 1, . . . , 5, the (strict) upper contour
set of individual ih at ≻xh is a subset of {i4, i5}. For instance, the (strict) upper contour set of individual i1
is the singleton set {i4}. In this case, the tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is called a priority cycle. In general, a
tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is a priority cycle if one can get hold of individuals {i4, . . . , it}, objects {x4, . . . ,
xt} such that their priority structure satisfies the property as stated above. In what follows, we present a
formal definition.
Definition 10.2. A tuple [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)], where i1, i2, i3 ∈ N and x1, x2, x3 ∈ A are all distinct, is
called a priority cycle at a priority structure ≻A if either τ(≻xh) = ih for all h = 1, 2, 3, or there exist
distinct individuals i4, . . . , it ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3} and distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x1, x2, x3} such that for
all h = 1, . . . , t, we have U(ih,≻xh) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}.
If a priority structure ≻A does not contain any priority cycle, then we say ≻A is acyclic.
Remark 10.1. Note that if ≻A contains a priority cycle [(i, j, k), (x, y, z)], then i ≻x {j, k}, j ≻y {i, k}, and
k ≻z {i, j}. Therefore every priority cycle is a strong cycle, and hence weak acyclicity implies acyclicity.
However, the converse is not true (see the priority structure in Example 10.2).
The following lemma establishes a connection between the acyclicity property of a collection of inher-
itance trees and that of a priority structure.
Proposition 10.1. Let Γ be a collection of inheritance trees which satisfies the priority property. Suppose a priority
structure ≻̂A is induced by Γ. Then, ≻̂A is acyclic if and only if Γ is acyclic.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix C.
We obtain the following corollary by applying Proposition 10.1 and Theorem 8.1 to Corollary 9.1. It
provides a characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules.
Corollary 10.2. Let ≻A be a priority structure. The FPTTC rule T
≻A is OSP-implementable if and only if ≻A is
acyclic.
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10.3 Relation between dual dictatorships (Troyan, 2019) and dual ownership of FPTTC rules
As we have mentioned earlier, Troyan (2019) introduces the notion of dual dictatorships. It follows from
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 of his paper that an FPTTC rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it satisfies
dual dictatorships, whereas Corollary 10.1 of our paper says that an FPTTC rule is OSP-implementable
if and only if it satisfies dual ownership. In what follows, we clarify the difference between these two
(conflicting) results and conclude that while dual dictatorships is a sufficient condition for an FPTTC rule
to be OSP-implementable, it is not necessary.
Dual dictatorships property of an FPTTC rule requires that in any submarket, at most two individuals
will own all the objects in the submarket. In contrast, dual ownership property of an FPTTC rule requires
that for every preference profile and every step of that FPTTC rule at that preference profile, at most two
individuals will own all the objects remained in reduced market at that step. The difference between these
two properties arises from the fact that not every submarket occurs at some step at some preference profile
of an FPTTC rule. In other words, dual dictatorships is stronger than dual ownership. We clarify this by
means of the following example. We consider the same number of individuals and objects in this example
as the results in Troyan (2019) are derived under that assumption.
Example 10.3. Consider the FPTTC rule given in Example 10.2. First, we argue that it satisfies dual
ownership. Since either individual i or individual l appears at the top position in each priority (see Table
10.2 in Example 10.2), it follows that for any preference profile, individuals i and l will own all the objects
at Step 1 of the FPTTC rule. Moreover, since there are only four individuals in the original market, for
any preference profile, at any step from Step 3 onward of the FPTTC rule, there will remain at most two
individuals in the corresponding submarket and hence dual ownership will be vacuously satisfied. In
what follows, we show that dual ownership will also be satisfied at Step 2 for any preference profile. We
distinguish three cases based on the possible assignments at Step 1.
(i) Suppose only individual i is assigned some object at Step 1. No matter whether individual i is
assigned object w or object x, individuals j and l will own all the objects at Step 2.
(ii) Suppose only individual l is assigned some object at Step 1.
(a) If l is assigned object y, then individuals i and k will own all the objects at Step 2.
(b) If l is assigned object z, then individuals i and j will own all the objects at Step 2.
(iii) Suppose both i and l are assigned some objects at Step 1. Since there are only four individuals in the
original market, only two individuals will remain in the reduced market at Step 2.
Since Cases (i), (ii), and (iii) are exhaustive, it follows that the FPTTC rule in Example 10.2 satisfies dual
ownership. We now proceed to show that it does not satisfy dual dictatorships. Consider the submarket
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consisting of individuals i, j, and k and objects x, y, and z. Here, individuals i, j, and k will own objects
x, y, and z, respectively, and hence the FPTTC rule under consideration violates dual dictatorships.
11 Relation between sequential barter with lurkers (Bade and Gonczarowski,
2017) and dual ownership
Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) introduce the notion of sequential barter with lurkers for an assignment
rule and show that an assignment rule is OSP-implementable and Pareto efficient if and only if it is a
sequential barter with lurkers rule (Theorem 7.2 in Bade and Gonczarowski (2017)). Since hierarchical
exchange rules satisfying acyclicity (or dual ownership) characterize all OSP-implementable, Pareto effi-
cient, as well as non-bossy assignment rules, technically they must be special cases of sequential barter
with lurkers rules, obtained under the imposition of non-bossiness. The sequential barter with lurkers
rules are defined in the approach of the dual ownership property.21 However, we do not see a way to
relate these two types of assignment rules as the formal definition of sequential barter with lurkers rules
(as given in Bade and Gonczarowski (2017)) is constructive (computer algorithmic) while hierarchical ex-
change rules are defined with a functional form. In what follows, we explain how hierarchical exchange
rules can be generalized to relax the non-bossiness requirement and sequential barter with lurkers rules
can be seen as such a generalization.
Recall that for a hierarchical exchange rule, the ownership of the objects (that is, which object will be
owned by which individual) in a given stage depends on the assignments of the owners in the previous
stages. For a sequential barter with lurkers rule, this ownership depends not only on the assignments of
the previous owners but also on their preferences. Thus, it is possible for a sequential barter with lurkers
rules that some individuals (who are the owners in a given stage) can change the assignments of some
other individuals (the individuals who remain in the market in the next stage) without changing their
own assignments (by changing their preferences only). Clearly, this makes the sequential barter with
lurkers rules bossy, while the hierarchical exchange rules (be it acyclic or not) remain non-bossy.
21The following verbal description of sequential barter with lurkers rules is taken from Bade and Gonczarowski (2017). “Se-
quential barter is a trading mechanism with many rounds. At each such round, there are at most two owners. Each not-yet-
matched house sequentially becomes owned by one of them. Each of the owners may decide to leave with a house that she owns,
or they may both agree to swap. If an owner does not get matched in the current round, she owns at least the same houses in
the next round. When a lurker appears, she may ultimately get matched to any one house in some set S. A lurker is similar to a
dictator in the sense that she may immediately appropriate all but one special house in the set S. If she favors this special house the
most, she may “lurk“ it, in which case she is no longer considered an owner (so there are at most two owners, and additionally
any number of lurkers, each for a different house). If no agent who is entitled to get matched with this special house chooses to
do so, then the lurker obtains it as a residual claimant. Otherwise, the lurker gets the second-best house in this set S.“
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12 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a characterization of OSP-implementable, Pareto efficient and non-bossy
assignment rules in the context of one-sided matching problem. We have shown that such assignment
rules are hierarchical exchange rules satisfying dual ownership. As corollaries of our result, we have
characterized all OSP-implementable hierarchical exchange rules, all OSP-implementable trading cycles
rules, and all OSP-implementable FPTTC rules.
The structure of OSP-implementable assignment rules in the context of two-sided matching problem
is not much explored. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2018) provide a sufficient condition for a deferred
acceptance rule to be OSP-implementable. We think providing a characterization of OSP-implementable
rules in the context of two-sided matching problem is an important problem and we are working on it.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 8.1
Let us first recall some of the notations used in the context of hierarchical exchange rules: for a preference
profile PN ∈ L
n(A) and a hierarchical exchange rule, Fs(PN) is the set of assigned objects in Stage s,
Ws(PN) is the set of assigned individuals in Stage s, W
s(PN) is the set of assigned individuals up to Stage
s (including Stage s), and Es(i, PN) is the endowment set for individual i in Stage s.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. (If part) Suppose f Γ does not satisfy dual ownership. We show that Γ contains an
inheritance cycle.
Since f Γ does not satisfy dual ownership, there exists a preference profile P̃N and a stage s
∗ of f Γ at
P̃N such that there are three individuals i1, i2, i3 and three objects x1, x2, x3 in the reduced market in Stage
s∗ with the property that individual ih owns the object xh for all h = 1, 2, 3. We proceed to show that
[(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is an inheritance cycle in Γ. We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose s∗ = 1.
Since for all h = 1, 2, 3, individual ih owns the object xh in Stage 1, by the definition of f
Γ, it follows
that individuals i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γx1 , Γx2 , and Γx3 , respectively. This means
[(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is an inheritance cycle in Γ.
CASE 2: Suppose s∗ > 1.
Let {i4, . . . , it} ⊆ N \ {i1, i2, i3}, {x4, . . . , xt} ⊆ A \ {x1, x2, x3}, an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4,
. . . , xt}), and a collection of root-paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t} be as follows.
(i) {i4, . . . , it} = W
s∗−1(P̃N).




where ih ∈ Ws(P̃N) for some s < s
∗. To see that this
is well-defined note that by the definition of f Γ, (a) for every ih ∈ W
s∗−1(P̃N), there exists exactly
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one stage s with s < s∗ such that ih ∈ Ws(P̃N), and (b) Es(ih, P̃N) ∩ Fs(P̃N) is a singleton set for all
ih ∈ Ws(P̃N) with s < s
∗.
(iii) For all h = 4, . . . , t, µ̂(ih) = f
Γ
ih
(P̃N). By the definition of f
Γ, it follows that µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4,
. . . , xt}).
(iv) (a) For all h = 1, 2, 3, πxh is the root-path in Γxh such that the “property rights“ of the object xh
travels along the root-path πxh up to Stage s
∗ (including Stage s∗) of f Γ at preference profile
P̃N .
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(b) For all h = 4, . . . , t, πxh is the root-path in Γxh such that the “property rights“ of the object
xh travels along the root-path πxh until it is assigned in the iterative procedure of f
Γ at the
preference profile P̃N .
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It follows from the definition of f Γ and the construction of {i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}, µ̂, and (πxh)h∈{1,...,t}
that
(i) (a) for all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual ih and the other individuals
in πxh are from the set {i4, . . . , it},
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths in
(πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̂(ih) is assigned to that edge, and
(ii) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path πxj ,
then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi .
This implies that [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is an inheritance cycle in Γ, which completes the proof of the “if“
part of Theorem 8.1.
(Only-if part) Suppose Γ contains an inheritance cycle [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)]. We show that f
Γ does not
satisfy dual ownership. By the definition of an inheritance cycle, one of the following two statements
must hold.
(1) Individuals i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γx1 , Γx2 , and Γx3 , respectively.
(2) There exist distinct individuals i4, . . . , it ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3}, distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x1, x2, x3},
an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}), and a collection of root-paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t} with the
properties that
22More precisely, if πxh = j1 y1 j2 y2 j3 y3 j4, then (a) there is a stage ŝ with ŝ ≤ s
∗ such that in all stages between ŝ and s∗
(including Stages ŝ and s∗), xh is owned by individual j4 (which is essentially individual ih), and (b) j1, j2 and j3 are assigned
objects y1, y2, and y3, respectively, before Stage ŝ. It should be noted that the assignments of j1, j2, and j3 can happen in any
order, for instance j1 might not be assigned in Stage 1 or j2 might be assigned before j1, etc.
23More precisely, if πxh = j1 y1 j2 y2 j3 for some xh ∈ Fs′ (P̃N) with s
′
< s∗, then (a) there is a stage ŝ with ŝ ≤ s′ such that in
all stages between ŝ and s′ (including Stages ŝ and s′), xh is owned by individual j3, and (b) j1 and j2 are assigned objects y1 and
y2, respectively, before Stage ŝ. As in the previous case, it should be noted that the assignments of j1 and j2 can happen in any
order, for instance j1 might not be assigned in Stage 1 or j2 might be assigned before j1, etc.
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(i) (a) for all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual ih and the other
individuals in πxh are from the set {i4, . . . , it},
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths
in (πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̂(ih) is assigned to that edge, and
(ii) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path
πxj , then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi .
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose (1) holds.
Since individuals i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γx1 , Γx2 , and Γx3 , respectively, it must
be that for any preference profile, individuals i1, i2, and i3 own objects x1, x2, and x3, respectively, in Stage
1 of f Γ at that preference profile. Therefore f Γ will not satisfy dual ownership.
CASE 2: Suppose (2) holds.
Assume for contradiction that f Γ satisfies dual ownership. Consider the preference profile P̃N defined
as follows. Each ih ∈ {i4, . . . , it} has a preference P̃ih such that τ(P̃ih) = µ̂(ih) and each j ∈ N \ {i4, . . . , it}
has a preference P̃j such that {x4, . . . , xt}P̃j(A \ {x4, . . . , xt}). The next claim establishes some properties
of the outcome of f Γ at P̃N in Stage 1.
Claim A.1. (a) W1(P̃N) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}, (b) f
Γ
i (P̃N) = µ̂(i) for all i ∈ W1(P̃N), and (c) xh ∈ F1(P̃N) for all
h = 4, . . . , t with ih ∈ W1(P̃N).





Moreover, by the construction of P̃N and the assumption on µ̂, we have τ(P̃i) ∈ {x4, . . . , xt} for all i ∈ N.




E1(ih, P̃N) and τ(P̃i) ∈ {x4, . . . , xt} for all i ∈ N, it follows from the definition
of f Γ that W1(P̃N) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it} and f
Γ
i (P̃N) = τ(P̃i) for all i ∈ W1(P̃N). These two facts, along with the
construction of P̃N , imply
W1(P̃N) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it} and f
Γ
i (P̃N) = µ̂(i) for all i ∈ W1(P̃N). (A.1)
Since f Γ satisfies dual ownership, it follows from the definition of f Γ that |W1(P̃N)| ≤ 2. We distinguish
two cases.
(A) Suppose |W1(P̃N)| = 1.
Since W1(P̃N) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}, without loss of generality, assume W1(P̃N) = {i4}. By (A.1) we have
f Γi4(P̃N) = µ̂(i4). This, along with the definition of f
Γ, implies that individual i4 is assigned to
the root-node of Γµ̂(i4). It follows from the definition of an inheritance tree and property (2).(i)
of the root-paths that πµ̂(i4) is a single-node root-path and µ̂(i4) = x4.
24 By the assumption that
24A root-path in an inheritance tree is called single-node if it ends at the root of the inheritance tree itself, that is, it contains a
single node.
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W1(P̃N) = {i4} and the facts that f
Γ
i4
(P̃N) = µ̂(i4), and µ̂(i4) = x4, we have F1(P̃N) = {x4}.
(B) Suppose |W1(P̃N)| = 2.
Since W1(P̃N) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}, without loss of generality, assume W1(P̃N) = {i4, i5}. By (A.1) we have
f Γi4(P̃N) = µ̂(i4) and f
Γ
i5
(P̃N) = µ̂(i5). This, along with the definition of f
Γ, implies that individuals
i4 and i5 are either assigned to the root-nodes of Γµ̂(i4) and Γµ̂(i5), respectively, or to the root-nodes of
Γµ̂(i5) and Γµ̂(i4), respectively.
(I) Suppose i4 and i5 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γµ̂(i4) and Γµ̂(i5), respectively. Using similar
logic as for (A), it follows that F1(P̃N) = {x4, x5}.
(II) Suppose i4 and i5 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γµ̂(i5) and Γµ̂(i4), respectively. It follows
from property (2).(ii) of the root-paths that both of πµ̂(i4) and πµ̂(i5) are single-node root-paths,
and µ̂(i4) = x5 and µ̂(i5) = x4. By the assumption that W1(P̃N) = {i4, i5} and the facts that
f Γi4(P̃N) = µ̂(i4), f
Γ
i5
(P̃N) = µ̂(i5), µ̂(i4) = x5, and µ̂(i5) = x4, it follows that F1(P̃N) = {x4, x5}.
Since Cases (A) and (B) are exhaustive, it follows that xh ∈ F1(P̃N) for all h = 4, . . . , t with ih ∈ W1(P̃N).
This, along with (A.1), completes the proof of Claim A.1. 
By Claim A.1, W1(P̃N) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}, f
Γ
i (P̃N) = µ̂(i) for all i ∈ W1(P̃N), and xh ∈ F1(P̃N) for all
h = 4, . . . , t with ih ∈ W1(P̃N). We proceed to show that there will be a stage s
∗ such that Ws
∗
(P̃N) = {i4,
. . . , it} and f Γi (P̃N) = µ̂(i) for all i ∈ W
s∗(P̃N). If W1(P̃N) = {i4, . . . , it}, then s
∗ = 1 and we are done.
Suppose W1(P̃N) ( {i4, . . . , it}, that is, W1(P̃N) is a proper subset of {i4, . . . , it}. Since W1(P̃N) ( {i4,
. . . , it}, f Γi (P̃N) = µ̂(i) for all i ∈ W1(P̃N), and xh ∈ F1(P̃N) for all h = 4, . . . , t with ih ∈ W1(P̃N), using
similar argument as for Claim A.1, it follows from the assumption regarding {i1, . . . , it}, {x1, . . . , xt}, µ̂,
(πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, and the construction of P̃N that W2(P̃N) ⊆
(
{i4, . . . , it} \ W1(P̃N)
)
, f Γi (P̃N) = µ̂(i) for all
i ∈ W2(P̃N), and xh ∈ F2(P̃N) for all h = 4, . . . , t with ih ∈ W2(P̃N). If W1(P̃N) ∪ W2(P̃N) = {i4, . . . , it},
then s∗ = 2 and we are done. Otherwise, continuing in this manner, we obtain a stage s∗ > 2 of f Γ at P̃N
such that Ws
∗
(P̃N) = {i4, . . . , it} and f
Γ
ih
(P̃N) = µ̂(ih) for all h = 4, . . . , t.
Since Ws
∗
(P̃N) = {i4, . . . , it} and f
Γ
ih
(P̃N) = µ̂(ih) for all h = 4, . . . , t, by the assumptions for Case 2, we
have xh ∈ Es∗+1(ih, P̃N) for all h = 1, 2, 3. This implies that individuals i1, i2, and i3 own the objects x1, x2,
and x3, respectively, in Stage s
∗ + 1 of f Γ at P̃N , a contradiction to our assumption that f
Γ satisfies dual
ownership. This completes the proof of the “only-if“ part of Theorem 8.1. 
Appendix B Proof of Theorem 7.1
We use Theorem 8.1 (which is presented after Theorem 7.1 in the body of the paper) in the proof of
Theorem 7.1. Therefore, for the sake of completeness, we have already presented the proof of Theorem
8.1 in the previous appendix (Appendix A).
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We first prove two lemmas which we will combine with two results of Pápai (2000) to complete the
proof of Theorem 7.1. In Lemma B.1, we show that a hierarchical exchange rule is OSP-implementable
if and only if it satisfies dual ownership, and in Lemma B.2, we show that every OSP-implementable,
non-bossy and Pareto efficient assignment rule is reallocation-proof.
B.1 Lemma B.1 and its proof
Lemma B.1. A hierarchical exchange rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it satisfies dual ownership.
Before we formally start proving Lemma B.1, to facilitate the proof we introduce the notion of a re-
duced tree structure and make two observations about it.
B.1.1 Reduced tree structure
For an inheritance tree Γa = 〈Ta, ζNIa , ζ
EO
a 〉 and an edge (v, v
′) ∈ E(Ta), we say that an inheritance tree
Γ̃a = 〈T̃a, ζ̃NIa , ζ̃
EO
a 〉 is obtained by collapsing the edge (v, v
′) if
(i) V(T̃a) = V(Ta) \
(









∪ {(v̂, v′)}, where v̂ is the parent node of v in Ta. If v = r(Ta),
then v̂ does not exist, and consequently, we take {(v̂, v′)} = ∅,
(iii) ζ̃NIa (v) = ζ
NI
a (v) for all v ∈ V(T̃a), and
(iv) ζ̃EOa (e) = ζ
EO






and ζ̃EOa (v̂, v
′) = ζEOa (v̂, v).
For an inheritance tree Γa = 〈Ta, ζNIa , ζ
EO
a 〉 and an edge (v, v
′) ∈ E(Ta), we say that an inheritance tree
Γ̃a = 〈T̃a, ζ̃NIa , ζ̃
EO
a 〉 is obtained by dropping the edge (v, v
′) if
(i) V(T̃a) = V(Ta) \ {v′′ | there exists a path in Ta from v to v′′ which contains v′},





(iii) ζ̃NIa (v) = ζ
NI
a (v) for all v ∈ V(T̃a), and
(iv) ζ̃EOa (e) = ζ
EO
a (e) for all e ∈ E(T̃a).
For an inheritance tree Γa = 〈Ta, ζNIa , ζ
EO
a 〉, we denote an edge (v, v
′) ∈ E(Ta) by (i, x) if ζNIa (v) = i and
ζEOa (v, v
′) = x in Γa. By the construction of Γa, ζEOa (v, v
′) = x implies a 6= x.
For a pair (i, x) ∈ N × A and a collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γx)x∈A, we define the reduced
collection Γ \ (i, x) as follows:
(i) If a = x, then drop the inheritance tree Γa.
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(ii) If a 6= x and ζNIa (r(Ta)) = i, then Γa \ (i, x) is obtained by collapsing the edge (i, x) in Γa.
25
(iii) If a 6= x and ζNIa (r(Ta)) 6= i, then Γa \ (i, x) is obtained by collapsing all edges (i, x) and dropping
all edges (j, x) with j 6= i in Γa.
For (i, x), (j, y) ∈ N × A and a collection of inheritance trees Γ = (Γx)x∈A, we denote the reduced
collection
(
Γ \ (i, x)
)
\ (j, y) by Γ \
(
(i, x), (j, y)
)
.







(j, y), (i, x)
)
.
Example B.1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and A = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Consider the collection of inheritance

































































































































Figure B.1: Collection of inheritance trees Γ for Example B.1
Consider the pair (1, x1) ∈ N × A. The reduced collection Γ \ (1, x1) is given in Figure B.2.































(c) Γx4 \ (1, x1)
Figure B.2: Reduced collection Γ \ (1, x1)
B.1.2 Two observations
Let T (Γ) = {i | ζNIx (r(Tx)) = i for some x ∈ A} be the set of individuals who appear at the root-node of
some inheritance tree in the collection of inheritance trees Γ. We now make two observations. The first
observation is straightforward, and see Step 2.a in the “Necessity Proof“ of Pápai (2000) for the second
observation.
Observation B.1. If Γ is acyclic, then |T (Γ)| ≤ 2.
Observation B.2. Suppose ζNIx (r(Tx)) = i for some x ∈ A and some i ∈ N. Then, for all PN ∈ L
n(A),
f Γi (PN)Rix.
B.1.3 Proof of Lemma B.1
(If part) Suppose f Γ satisfies dual ownership. By Theorem 8.1, Γ is acyclic. We show that f Γ is OSP-
implementable by using induction on the number of individuals, which we refer to as the size of the
market.
Base Case: Suppose |N| = 1.26 The following extensive-form assignment mechanism, labeled as G1,
implements f Γ.
Step 1. Ask the only individual which object is her top choice and assign her that object.
It is simple to check that the extensive-form assignment mechanism G1 is OSP. Since the OSP mecha-
nism G1 implements f Γ, it follows that f Γ is OSP-implementable. Now, we proceed to prove the induction
step.
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that f Γ is OSP-implementable for |N| ≤ m. We show f Γ is OSP-implementable
for |N| = m + 1. Since Γ is acyclic, by Observation B.1, we have |T (Γ)| ≤ 2. We distinguish the following
two cases.
CASE A: |T (Γ)| = 1.
Let T (Γ) = {i}. Define the extensive-form assignment mechanism Gm+1 as follows:
26With only one individual, Γ is trivially acyclic.
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Step 1. Ask individual i which object is her top choice and assign her that object, say x.
Step 2. Consider the reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}) where individual i is removed from the market
together with the object x she is assigned. This reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}) is of size m.
Claim B.1. Γ \ (i, x) is acyclic.
Proof of Claim B.1. We denote the reduced collection Γ \ (i, x) by (Γ̄a)a∈A\{x}. Assume for contradiction
that (Γ̄a)a∈A\{x} contains an inheritance cycle, say [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)]. By the definition of an inheri-
tance cycle, one of the following two statements must hold.
(1) Individuals i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γ̄x1 , Γ̄x2 , and Γ̄x3 , respectively.
(2) There exist distinct individuals i4, . . . , it ∈ N \ {i, i1, i2, i3}, distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x, x1,
x2, x3}, an allocation µ̄ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}), and a collection of root-paths (π̄xh)h∈{1,...,t},
where π̄xh lies in the reduced tree Γ̄xh for all h = 1, . . . , t, with the properties that
(i) (a) for all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path π̄xh is individual ih and other individ-
uals in π̄xh are from the set {i4, . . . , it},
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths
in (π̄xh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̄(ih) is assigned to that edge, and
(ii) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̄(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path
π̄xj , then individual µ̄(xj) does not lie in the root-path π̄xi .
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose (1) holds.
Let {j1, j2, j3, j4} ⊆ N, {y1, y2, y3, y4} ⊆ A, an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({j4}, {y4}), and a collection of root-
paths (πyh)h∈{1,...,4} be as follows
(a) jh = ih for all h = 1, 2, 3, and j4 = i.
(b) yh = xh for all h = 1, 2, 3, and y4 = x.
(c) µ̂(j4) = y4.
(d) πyh is the root-path in Γyh to the root of Γ̄yh for all h = 1, 2, 3, and πy4 is the single-node root-path in
Γy4 .
By the assumption of Case A, T (Γ) = {i}, which implies that individual i is assigned to the root-
node of Γx. This, together with the definition of {j1, j2, j3, j4}, {y1, y2, y3, y4}, µ̂, and (πyh)h∈{1,...,4}, and the
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assumption of Case 1, implies that


(a) for all h = 1, . . . , 4, the last element of the root-path πyh is individual jh
and the other individuals in πyh are from the set {j4}, and
(b) if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual j4 in any of the root-paths in (πyh)h∈{1,...,4},




This shows that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] satisfies (i) of the definition of inheritance cycle (Definition 8.1).
Now, we proceed to show that (ii) of Definition 8.1 is also satisfied by [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)], that is,
we show that for all distinct objects yi, yj ∈ {y4}, if individual µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of the root-path
πyj , then individual µ̂(yj) does not lie in the root-path πyi . Since {y4} is a singleton set, this condition
is vacuously satisfied. Therefore, [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] is an inheritance cycle at Γ, a contradiction to the
fact that Γ is acyclic.
CASE 2: Suppose (2) holds.
Let {j1, . . . , jt+1} ⊆ N, {y1, . . . , yt+1} ⊆ A, an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({j4, . . . , jt+1}, {y4, . . . , yt+1}), and a
collection of root-paths (πyh)h∈{1,...,t+1} be as follows.
(a) jh = ih for all h = 1, . . . , t, and jt+1 = i.
(b) yh = xh for all h = 1, . . . , t, and yt+1 = x.
(c) µ̂(jh) = µ̄(ih) for all h = 4, . . . , t, and µ̂(jt+1) = yt+1.
(d) πyh is the minimal root-path in Γyh that contains the nodes of π̄xh in Γ̄xh for all h = 1, . . . , t, and πyt+1
is the single-node root-path in Γyt+1 .
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By the assumption of Case A, T (Γ) = {i}, which implies that individual i is assigned to the root-node
of Γx. This, together with the definition of {j1, . . . , jt+1}, {y1, . . . , yt+1}, µ̂, and (πyh)h∈{1,...,t+1}, and the
assumption of Case 2, implies that


(a) for all h = 1, . . . , t + 1, the last element of the root-path πyh is individual jh
and the other individuals in πyh are from the set {j4, . . . , jt+1}, and
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t + 1, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual jh in any of the root-paths




This shows that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] satisfies (i) of Definition 8.1.
Now, we proceed to show that (ii) of Definition 8.1 is also satisfied by [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)], that is,
we show that for all distinct objects yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt+1}, if individual µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of the
27Note that such root-paths exist by the construction of Γ̄xh .
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root-path πyj , then individual µ̂(yj) does not lie in the root-path πyi . Assume for contradiction that yi,
yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt+1} are two distinct objects such that individual µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of the root-path
πyj and individual µ̂(yj) lies in the root-path πyi . Since µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of πyj , the fact that πyt+1 is
a single-node root-path, implies yj 6= yt+1. Suppose yi = yt+1. Since πyt+1 is single-node root-path, µ̂(yj)
lies in πyi , and jt+1 is the last element of πyt+1 , it follows that µ̂(yj) = jt+1. However, by the definition
of µ̂, µ̂(yj) = jt+1 implies yj = yt+1, which contradicts the fact yj 6= yt+1. So, it must be that yi 6= yt+1.
Combining the facts that yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt+1}, yj 6= yt+1, and yi 6= yt+1, we obtain yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt}.
However, since yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt}, it follows from the definition of {j1, . . . , jt+1}, {y1, . . . , yt+1}, µ̂, and
(πyh)h∈{1,...,t+1} that individual µ̄(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path π̄xj and individual µ̄(xj) lies in the
root-path π̄xi , which contradicts (2).(ii). This proves that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] satisfies (ii) of Definition
8.1. Therefore, [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] is an inheritance cycle at Γ, a contradiction to the fact that Γ is acyclic.
This completes the proof of Claim B.1. 
By the induction hypothesis and Claim B.1, it follows that there exists an OSP mechanism Gm that
implements f Γ restricted to the reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}). Run the extensive-form assignment
mechanism Gm on the reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}).
By definition, the extensive-form assignment mechanism Gm+1 implements f Γ. This extensive-form
assignment mechanism is OSP for individual i since she receives her top choice. For every other individ-
ual, her first decision node comes after i has been assigned, and hence, her strategic decision is equivalent
to that under the OSP mechanism that implements f Γ restricted to the reduced market. Thus, the above
extensive-form assignment mechanism is OSP for all individuals, and hence, f Γ is OSP-implementable.
CASE B: |T (Γ)| = 2.
Let T (Γ) = {i, j}. Let Ai = {x ∈ A | ζ
NI
x (r(Tx)) = i} and Aj = {y ∈ A | ζ
NI
y (r(Ty)) = j}. Define the
extensive-form assignment mechanism Gm+1 as follows:
Step 1. For each x ∈ Ai, ask i if her top choice is x. If i answers “Yes“ for some x, assign her this x, and go
to Step 1(a). Otherwise, jump to Step 2.
Step 1(a). We now have a reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}) of size m.
Claim B.2. Γ \ (i, x) is acyclic.
The proof of Claim B.2 follows by using similar logic as for the proof of Claim B.1. The only adjustment
needed for the proof of Claim B.2 over the proof of Claim B.1 is that instead of T (Γ) = {i} (which is an
assumption of Case A), which means individual i is assigned to the root-node of every inheritance tree,
we need to consider x ∈ Ai (which is an assumption of Step 1 in Case B) meaning that individual i is
assigned to the root-node of the inheritance tree for x.
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By the induction hypothesis and Claim B.2, it follows that there exists an OSP mechanism Gm that
implements f Γ restricted to the reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}). Run the extensive-form assignment
mechanism Gm on the reduced market (N \ {i}, A \ {x}).
Step 2. For each y ∈ Aj, ask j if her top choice is y. If j answers “Yes“ for some y, assign her this y, and go
to Step 2(a). Otherwise, jump to Step 3.
Step 2(a). We now have a reduced market (N \ {j}, A \ {y}) of size m. Similar to Claim B.2, we have the
following claim.
Claim B.3. Γ \ (j, y) is acyclic.
By the induction hypothesis and Claim B.3, it follows that there exists an OSP mechanism Gm that
implements f Γ restricted to the reduced market (N \ {j}, A \ {y}). Run the extensive-form assignment
mechanism Gm on the reduced market (N \ {j}, A \ {y}).
Step 3. If the answers to both Step 1 and Step 2 are “No“, then i’s top choice belongs to Aj, and j’s top
choice belongs to Ai. Ask i for her top choice x, and j for her top choice y. Assign x to i and y to j, and go
to Step 3(a).
Step 3(a). We now have a reduced market (N \ {i, j}, A \ {x, y}) of size m − 1.
Claim B.4. Γ \
(
(i, x), (j, y)
)
is acyclic.
Proof of Claim B.4. Let us denote the reduced collection Γ \
(
(i, x), (j, y)
)
by (Γ̄a)a∈A\{x,y}. Assume for
contradiction that (Γ̄a)a∈A\{x,y} contains an inheritance cycle, say [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)]. By the definition
of an inheritance cycle, one of the following two statements must hold.
(1) Individuals i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γ̄x1 , Γ̄x2 , and Γ̄x3 , respectively.
(2) There exist distinct individuals i4, . . . , it ∈ N \ {i, j, i1, i2, i3}, distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x, y, x1,
x2, x3}, an allocation µ̄ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}), and a collection of root-paths (π̄xh)h∈{1,...,t},
where π̄xh lies in the reduced tree Γ̄xh for all h = 1, . . . , t, with the properties that
(i) (a) for all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path π̄xh is individual ih and other individ-
uals in π̄xh are from the set {i4, . . . , it},
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths
in (π̄xh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̄(ih) is assigned to that edge, and
(ii) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̄(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path
π̄xj , then individual µ̄(xj) does not lie in the root-path π̄xi .
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose (1) holds.
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Let {j1, . . . , j5} ⊆ N, {y1, . . . , y5} ⊆ A, an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({j4, j5}, {y4, y5}), and a collection of
root-paths (πyh)h∈{1,...,5} be as follows.
(a) jh = ih for all h = 1, 2, 3, and j4 = i and j5 = j.
(b) yh = xh for all h = 1, 2, 3, and y4 = y and y5 = x.
(c) µ̂(j4) = y5 and µ̂(j5) = y4.
(d) πyh is the root-path in Γyh to the root of Γ̄yh for all h = 1, 2, 3, and πy4 and πy5 are the single-node
root-paths in Γy4 and Γy5 , respectively.
By the assumption of Step 3 in Case B, x ∈ Aj and y ∈ Ai, which imply that individuals i and j are
assigned to the root-nodes of Γy and Γx, respectively. This, together with the definition of {j1, . . . , j5},
{y1, . . . , y5}, µ̂, and (πyh)h∈{1,...,5}, and the assumption of Case 1, implies that


(a) for all h = 1, . . . , 5, the last element of the root-path πyh is individual jh
and the other individuals in πyh are from the set {j4, j5}, and
(b) for all h = 4, 5, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual jh in any of the root-paths




This shows that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] satisfies (i) of Definition 8.1.
Now, we proceed to show that (ii) of Definition 8.1 is also satisfied by [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)], that is,
we show that for all distinct objects yi, yj ∈ {y4, y5}, if individual µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of the root-path
πyj , then individual µ̂(yj) does not lie in the root-path πyi . Since πy4 and πy5 are single-node root-paths,
no individual can be in the interior of πy4 or in the interior of πy5 . This proves that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)]
satisfies (ii) of Definition 8.1. Therefore, [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] is an inheritance cycle at Γ, a contradiction
to the fact that Γ is acyclic.
CASE 2: Suppose (2) holds.
Let {j1, . . . , jt+2} ⊆ N, {y1, . . . , yt+2} ⊆ A, an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({j4, . . . , jt+2}, {y4, . . . , yt+2}), and a
collection of root-paths (πyh)h∈{1,...,t+2} be as follows.
(a) jh = ih for all h = 1, . . . , t, and jt+1 = i and jt+2 = j.
(b) yh = xh for all h = 1, . . . , t, and yt+1 = y and yt+2 = x.
(c) µ̂(jh) = µ̄(ih) for all h = 4, . . . , t, and µ̂(jt+1) = yt+2 and µ̂(jt+2) = yt+1.
(d) πyh is the minimal root-path in Γyh that contains the nodes of π̄xh in the reduced tree Γ̄xh for all
h = 1, . . . , t, and πyt+1 and πyt+2 are the single-node root-paths in Γyt+1 and Γyt+2 , respectively.
28
28Such root-paths will exist by the construction of Γ̄xh .
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By the assumption of Step 3 in Case B, x ∈ Aj and y ∈ Ai, which imply that individuals i and j are
assigned to the root-nodes of Γy and Γx, respectively. This, together with the definition of {j1, . . . , jt+2},
{y1, . . . , yt+2}, µ̂, and (πyh)h∈{1,...,t+2}, and the assumption of Case 2, implies that


(a) for all h = 1, . . . , t + 2, the last element of the root-path πyh is individual jh
and the other individuals in πyh are from the set {j4, . . . , jt+2}, and
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t + 2, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual jh in any of the root-paths




This shows that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] satisfies (i) of Definition 8.1.
Now, we proceed to show that (ii) of Definition 8.1 is also satisfied by [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)], that is,
we show that for all distinct objects yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt+2}, if individual µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of the
root-path πyj , then individual µ̂(yj) does not lie in the root-path πyi . Assume for contradiction that yi,
yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt+2} are two distinct objects such that individual µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of the root-path
πyj and individual µ̂(yj) lies in the root-path πyi . Since µ̂(yi) lies in the interior of πyj , the fact that πyt+1
and πyt+2 are single-node root-paths, implies yj 6∈ {yt+1, yt+2}. Suppose yi ∈ {yt+1, yt+2}. Since πyt+1 and
πyt+2 are single-node root-paths, µ̂(yj) lies in πyi , and jh is the last element of πyh for all h = t + 1, t + 2, it
follows that µ̂(yj) ∈ {jt+1, jt+2}. However, by the definition of µ̂, µ̂(yj) ∈ {jt+1, jt+2} implies yj ∈ {yt+1,
yt+2}, which contradicts the fact yj 6∈ {yt+1, yt+2}. So, it must be that yi /∈ {yt+1, yt+2}. Combining the
facts that yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt+2}, yj /∈ {yt+1, yt+2}, and yi /∈ {yt+1, yt+2}, we obtain yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt}.
However, since yi, yj ∈ {y4, . . . , yt}, it follows from the definition of {j1, . . . , jt+2}, {y1, . . . , yt+2}, µ̂, and
(πyh)h∈{1,...,t+2} that individual µ̄(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path π̄xj and individual µ̄(xj) lies in the
root-path π̄xi , which contradicts (2).(ii). This proves that [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] satisfies (ii) of Definition
8.1. Therefore, [(j1, j2, j3), (y1, y2, y3)] is an inheritance cycle at Γ, a contradiction to the fact that Γ is acyclic.
This completes the proof of Claim B.4. 
By the induction hypothesis and Claim B.4, it follows that there exists an OSP mechanism Gm−1 that
implements f Γ restricted to the reduced market (N \ {i, j}, A \ {x, y}). Run the extensive-form assignment
mechanism Gm−1 on the reduced market (N \ {i, j}, A \ {x, y}).
By definition, the extensive-form assignment mechanism Gm+1 implements f Γ. We show that Gm+1 is
OSP for all individuals by showing it for the case where |N| = 4. The proof for other cases is similar.
Consider an allocation problem with four individuals N = {i1, i2, i3, i4} and five objects A = {x1, x2,
x3, x4, x5}. Let Γ be an acyclic collection of inheritance trees such that T (Γ) = {i1, i2}, Ai1 = {x1, x2}, and
Ai2 = {x3, x4, x5}. In Figure B.3, we provide the structure of the extensive-form assignment mechanism
G4 which implements the hierarchical exchange rule f Γ.
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f Γi2 = x5,
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τ(Pi1 ) ∈ {x3, x4, x5}
f Γi1 = x2,
Use induction on
(N \ {i1}, A \ {x2})
τ(Pi1 ) = x2
Figure B.3: Structure of G4
In Figure B.3, node v1 (which is the root-node of G
4) is assigned to individual i1 and there are |Ai1 |+ 1
outgoing edges from this node, node v2 is assigned to individual i2 and there are |Ai2 |+ 1 outgoing edges
from this node, and node v3 is assigned to individual i1 and there are |Ai2 | outgoing edges from this node.
Nodes v4, v5, and v6 are assigned to individual i2 and there are |Ai1 | outgoing edges from each of these
nodes.
It follows from the definition of G4 and Observation B.2 that G4 satisfies the OSP property at node v1
(for individual i1). We distinguish two cases.
(i) Suppose τ(Pi1) ∈ {x1, x2}.
Individual i1 receives her top choice. The first decision node of every other individual comes af-
ter i1 has been assigned, and hence, their strategic decisions are equivalent to that under the OSP
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mechanism that implements f Γ restricted to the reduced market.
(ii) Suppose τ(Pi1) ∈ {x3, x4, x5}.
It follows from the definition of G4 and Observation B.2 that G4 satisfies the OSP property at node
v2 (for individual i2).
(a) Suppose τ(Pi2) ∈ {x3, x4, x5}. Individual i2 receives her top choice. For every other individ-
ual, her strategic decision is equivalent to that under the OSP mechanism that implements f Γ
restricted to the reduced market.
(b) Suppose τ(Pi2) ∈ {x1, x2}. Both i1 and i2 receive their top choices. The first decision node
of every other individual comes after i1 and i2 have been assigned, and hence, their strategic
decisions are equivalent to that under the OSP mechanism that implements f Γ restricted to the
reduced market.
Since Cases (i) and (ii) are exhaustive, it follows that the extensive-form assignment mechanism G4 is OSP
for all individuals, and hence, f Γ is OSP-implementable for this particular instance.
Since Case A and Case B are exhaustive, it follows that f Γ is OSP-implementable for |N| = m + 1. This
completes the proof of the induction step, and thereby completes the proof of the “if“ part of Lemma B.1.
(Only-if part) Suppose f Γ does not satisfy dual ownership. We show that f Γ is not OSP-implementable.
Since f Γ does not satisfy dual ownership, there exist a preference profile P′N and a stage s
∗ of f Γ at P′N
such that there are three individuals i1, i2, i3 and three objects x1, x2, x3 in the reduced market in Stage s
∗
with the property that for all h = 1, 2, 3, individual ih owns the object xh in Stage s
∗.
Note that if an assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is not OSP-implementable on some restricted domain
P̃N ⊆ L
n(A), then f is not OSP-implementable on the whole domain Ln(A) (see Li (2017) for details). We
distinguish the following two cases.
CASE A: Suppose s∗ = 1.
Consider the restricted domain P̃N defined as follows. Each l ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3} has only one (admissible)
preference P′l , and each individual in {i1, i2, i3} has two preferences, defined as follows (the dots indicate
that all preferences for the corresponding parts are irrelevant and can be chosen arbitrarily).29
Individual i1 Individual i2 Individual i3
x2x3x1 . . . x3x1x2 . . . x1x2x3 . . .
x3x2x1 . . . x1x3x2 . . . x2x1x3 . . .
Table B.1
29For instance, x1x2x3 . . . indicates (any) preference that ranks x1 first, x2 second, and x3 third.
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In Table B.2, we present some facts regarding the outcome of f Γ on the restricted domain P̃N . These
fact are deduced by the construction of P̃N along with the assumptions for Case A.






P̃1N x2x3x1 . . . x3x1x2 . . . x1x2x3 . . . x2 x3 x1
P̃2N x2x3x1 . . . x1x3x2 . . . x1x2x3 . . . x2 x1 x3
P̃3N x2x3x1 . . . x3x1x2 . . . x2x1x3 . . . x1 x3 x2
P̃4N x2x3x1 . . . x1x3x2 . . . x2x1x3 . . . x2 x1 x3
P̃5N x3x2x1 . . . x3x1x2 . . . x1x2x3 . . . x3 x2 x1
P̃6N x3x2x1 . . . x1x3x2 . . . x1x2x3 . . . x3 x2 x1
P̃7N x3x2x1 . . . x3x1x2 . . . x2x1x3 . . . x1 x3 x2
P̃8N x3x2x1 . . . x1x3x2 . . . x2x1x3 . . . x3 x1 x2
Table B.2: Partial outcome of f Γ on P̃N
Assume for contradiction that f Γ is OSP-implementable on P̃N . So, there exists an OSP mechanism G̃
that implements f Γ on P̃N . Note that since f
Γ(P̃1N) 6= f
Γ(P̃8N), there exists a node in the OSP mechanism
G̃ that has at least two edges. Also, note that since each individual l ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3} has exactly one
preference in P̃l , whenever there are more than one outgoing edges from a node, the node must be as-
signed to some individual in {i1, i2, i3}. Consider the first node (from the root) v that has two edges and,




N . Note that
both of them pass through the node v at which P̃3i1 and P̃
5
i1















(P̃3N) = x1, and f
Γ
i1
(P̃5N) = x3 together contradict
OSP-implementability of f Γ on P̃N .
CASE B: Suppose s∗ > 1.
Recall that for the preference profile P′N , F
s∗−1(P′N) is the set of assigned objects up to Stage s
∗ − 1
(including Stage s∗ − 1) of f Γ at P′N . Fix a preference P̂ ∈ L(F
s∗−1(P′N)) over these objects.
Consider the restricted domain P̃N defined as follows. Each l ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3} has only one (admissible)
preference P′l , and each individual in {i1, i2, i3} has two preferences, defined as follows.
30
Individual i1 Individual i2 Individual i3
P̂x2x3x1 . . . P̂x3x1x2 . . . P̂x1x2x3 . . .
P̂x3x2x1 . . . P̂x1x3x2 . . . P̂x2x1x3 . . .
Table B.3
30For instance, P̂x1x2x3 . . . denotes a preference where objects in F
s∗−1(P′N) are ranked at the top according to the preference
P̂, objects x1, x2, and x3 are ranked consecutively after that (in that order), and the ranking of the rest of the objects is arbitrarily.
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In Table B.4, we present some facts regarding the outcome of f Γ on the restricted domain P̃N that can
be deduced by the construction of the restricted domain P̃N along with the assumptions for Case B. The
verification of these facts is left to the reader.






P̃1N P̂x2x3x1 . . . P̂x3x1x2 . . . P̂x1x2x3 . . . x2 x3 x1
P̃2N P̂x2x3x1 . . . P̂x1x3x2 . . . P̂x1x2x3 . . . x2 x1 x3
P̃3N P̂x2x3x1 . . . P̂x3x1x2 . . . P̂x2x1x3 . . . x1 x3 x2
P̃4N P̂x2x3x1 . . . P̂x1x3x2 . . . P̂x2x1x3 . . . x2 x1 x3
P̃5N P̂x3x2x1 . . . P̂x3x1x2 . . . P̂x1x2x3 . . . x3 x2 x1
P̃6N P̂x3x2x1 . . . P̂x1x3x2 . . . P̂x1x2x3 . . . x3 x2 x1
P̃7N P̂x3x2x1 . . . P̂x3x1x2 . . . P̂x2x1x3 . . . x1 x3 x2
P̃8N P̂x3x2x1 . . . P̂x1x3x2 . . . P̂x2x1x3 . . . x3 x1 x2
Table B.4: Partial outcome of f Γ on P̃N
Using a similar argument as for Case A, it follows from Table B.4 that f Γ is not OSP-implementable on
P̃N . This completes the proof of the “only-if“ part of Lemma B.1. 
B.2 Lemma B.2 and its proof
Lemma B.2 involves the notion of reallocation-proof assignment rules, which we present first.
Definition B.1 (Pápai 2000). An assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is manipulable through reallocation if
there exist PN ∈ L
n(A), distinct individuals i, j ∈ N, and P̃i ∈ L(A), P̃j ∈ L(A) such that
(i) f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri fi(PN),
(ii) fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN), and
(iii) fi(PN) = fi(P̃i, P−i) 6= fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) and f j(PN) = f j(P̃j, P−j) 6= f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j).
An assignment rule is reallocation-proof if it is not manipulable through reallocation.
Lemma B.2. Suppose an assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is OSP-implementable, non-bossy and Pareto efficient.
Then, f is reallocation-proof.
Proof of Lemma B.2. Since f is OSP-implementable, by Remark 4.1, f is strategy-proof. Assume for
contradiction that f is not reallocation-proof. Then, there exist PN ∈ L
n(A), distinct individuals i, j ∈ N,
and P̃i ∈ L(A), P̃j ∈ L(A) such that
(i) f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri fi(PN),
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(ii) fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN), and
(iii) fi(PN) = fi(P̃i, P−i) 6= fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) and f j(PN) = f j(P̃j, P−j) 6= f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j).
Using non-bossiness, fi(PN) = fi(P̃i, P−i) implies f (PN) = f (P̃i, P−i), and f j(PN) = f j(P̃j, P−j) implies
f (PN) = f (P̃j, P−j). Combining the facts that f (PN) = f (P̃i, P−i) and f (PN) = f (P̃j, P−j), we have
f (PN) = f (P̃i, P−i) = f (P̃j, P−j). (B.5)
Claim B.5.
{
fi(PN), f j(PN), fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j), f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)
}
⊆ A.
Proof of Claim B.5. Assume for contradiction that fi(PN) = ∅. By (B.5), we have fi(PN) = fi(P̃j, P−j).
Because fi(PN) = ∅ and fi(PN) = fi(P̃j, P−j), we have fi(P̃j, P−j) = ∅. Since f is strategy-proof, fi(P̃j,
P−j) = ∅ implies fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = ∅. However, as fi(PN) = ∅ and fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = ∅, we have a
contradiction to fi(PN) 6= fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). So, it must be that
fi(PN) 6= ∅. (B.6)
Using a similar argument, we have
f j(PN) 6= ∅. (B.7)
Since fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN), (B.7) implies fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) 6= ∅. Also, the fact f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri fi(PN),
together with (B.6), implies f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) 6= ∅. This completes the proof of Claim B.5. 
Claim B.6. fi(PN) = f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j).
Proof of Claim B.6. Assume for contradiction that fi(PN) 6= f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). Let fi(PN) = w, f j(PN) = x,
fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = y, and f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = z. By Claim B.5, we have w, x, y, z 6= ∅. Since fi(PN) = w and
f j(PN) = x, feasibility implies w 6= x. Similarly by means of feasibility, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = y and f j(P̃i, P̃j,
P−i,j) = z together imply y 6= z. Since fi(PN) 6= fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j), we have w 6= y. Similarly f j(PN) 6= f j(P̃i,
P̃j, P−i,j) implies x 6= z, and fi(PN) 6= f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) implies w 6= z. Moreover, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN)
implies x 6= y. However, the facts w, x, y, z 6= ∅, w 6= x, y 6= z, w 6= y, x 6= z, w 6= z, and x 6= y together
imply w, x, y, and z are all distinct objects.
Since fi(PN) 6= f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j), f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Ri fi(PN) implies f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pi fi(PN). The facts fi(PN) =




i , P−i) 6= z for all P
′
i ∈ L(A). (B.8)
By (B.5) we have fi(PN) = fi(P̃j, P−j). This, along with the fact that fi(PN) = w, yields fi(P̃j, P−j) = w.
Since f is strategy-proof, the facts fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = y and fi(P̃j, P−j) = w together imply yR̃iw, which,
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along with the fact that w 6= y, yields yP̃iw. Also, combining the facts that fi(PN) = w and fi(PN) = fi(P̃i,
P−i), we have fi(P̃i, P−i) = w. Since yP̃iw and fi(P̃i, P−i) = w, by strategy-proofness, we have
fi(P
′
i , P−i) 6= y for all P
′
i ∈ L(A). (B.9)
Moreover, since zPiw and fi(P̃j, P−j) = w, by strategy-proofness, we have
fi(P
′
i , P̃j, P−i,j) 6= z for all P
′
i ∈ L(A). (B.10)
Let P̂i rank z first, y second, and w third. Since f is strategy-proof and non-bossy, the fact fi(P̃i, P̃j,
P−i,j) = y and (B.10) imply
f (P̂i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.11)
Similarly, by strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, the fact that fi(PN) = w along with (B.8) and (B.9),
yields
f (P̂i, P−i) = f (PN). (B.12)
By (B.12) we have f j(P̂i, P−i) = f j(PN). This, along with the fact f j(PN) = x, yields f j(P̂i, P−i) = x. Also,
the facts f j(PN) = x, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = y, and fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN) together imply yPjx. Since yPjx and
f j(P̂i, P−i) = x, by strategy-proofness, we have
f j(P̂i, P
′
j , P−i,j) 6= y for all P
′
j ∈ L(A). (B.13)
Let P̂j rank y first and z second. By (B.11) we have f j(P̂i, P̃j, P−i,j) = f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). This, along with
the fact f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = z, yields f j(P̂i, P̃j, P−i,j) = z. Since f is strategy-proof and non-bossy, the fact
f j(P̂i, P̃j, P−i,j) = z and (B.13) imply f (P̂i, P̂j, P−i,j) = f (P̂i, P̃j, P−i,j). This, along with (B.11), yields
f (P̂i, P̂j, P−i,j) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.14)
Because fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = y and f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = z, (B.14) implies fi(P̂i, P̂j, P−i,j) = y and f j(P̂i, P̂j,
P−i,j) = z. However, since zP̂iy and yP̂jz, the facts fi(P̂i, P̂j, P−i,j) = y and f j(P̂i, P̂j, P−i,j) = z together
contradict Pareto efficiency.
So, it must be that fi(PN) = f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). This completes the proof of Claim B.6. 
Since f is Pareto efficient, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN) implies that there exists k ∈ N \ {j} such that fk(PN) =
fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). Also, the facts fk(PN) = fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) and fi(PN) 6= fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) together imply k 6= i.
Let fi(PN) = a, f j(PN) = b, and fk(PN) = c. Combining the facts that fk(PN) = fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) and
fk(PN) = c, we have fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c. Also the fact fi(PN) = a along with Claim B.6, implies f j(P̃i, P̃j,
P−i,j) = a. Let fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = d.
51
Claim B.7. a, b, and c are distinct objects, d ∈ A, and a, c, and d are distinct objects.
Proof of Claim B.7. Since fi(PN) = a, f j(PN) = b, and fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c, by Claim B.5, we have a 6= ∅,
b 6= ∅, and c 6= ∅. Moreover, since fi(PN) = a, f j(PN) = b, and fk(PN) = c, feasibility implies a, b, and c
are all distinct objects.
Now, we show d ∈ A. Assume for contradiction that d = ∅. Consider the preference profiles presented









k . Here, l denotes an individual (might be empty) other than i, j, k. Note that such an individual
does not change her preference across the mentioned preference profiles.
Preference profiles Individual i Individual j Individual k . . . Individual l
P1N P̃i ca . . . bc . . . . . . Pl
P2N P̃i cba . . . bc . . . . . . Pl
P3N P̃i ca . . . Pk . . . Pl
P4N P̃i cba . . . Pk . . . Pl
Table B.5: Preference profiles for Claim B.7
The facts f j(PN) = b, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c, and fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN) together imply cPjb. Moreover,
f j(PN) = b and (B.5) yield f j(P̃i, P−i) = b. Since cPjb and f j(P̃i, P−i) = b, by strategy-proofness, we have
f j(P̃i, P
′
j , P−i,j) 6= c for all P
′
j ∈ L(A). (B.15)
By strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, the fact f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a and (B.15) imply
f (P3N) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.16)
The facts fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = d and d = ∅ together imply fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = ∅. Moreover, fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = ∅
and (B.16) imply fk(P
3
N) = ∅. Since f is strategy-proof and non-bossy, fk(P
3
N) = ∅ yields f (P
1
N) = f (P
3
N).
This, together with (B.16), implies
f (P1N) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.17)
Similarly, by strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, the fact f j(P̃i, P−i) = b and (B.15) imply f (P
4
N) = f (P̃i,
P−i). This, along with (B.5), yields
f (P4N) = f (PN). (B.18)
Since f j(PN) = b and fk(PN) = c, by (B.18) we have f j(P
4
N) = b and fk(P
4
N) = c. By strategy-proofness,
fk(P
4
N) = c implies fk(P
2
N) ∈ {b, c}. Suppose fk(P
2
N) = c. Since fk(P
2
N) = c and fk(P
4
N) = c, by non-
bossiness and the fact that f j(P
4
N) = b, we have f j(P
2
N) = b. However, f j(P
2
N) = b and fk(P
2
N) = c together
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contradict Pareto efficiency. So, it must be that
fk(P
2
N) = b. (B.19)
Since f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a, by (B.17) we have f j(P
1
N) = a. Also, by (B.19) we have f j(P
2
N) 6= b. By strategy-
proofness, the facts f j(P
1
N) = a and f j(P
2
N) 6= b imply f j(P
2
N) = a. Since f j(P
1
N) = a and f j(P
2
N) = a, by
non-bossiness and (B.17), we have
f (P2N) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.20)
However, since fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = ∅, by (B.20) we have fk(P
2
N) = ∅, a contradiction to (B.19). So, it must
be that
d ∈ A. (B.21)
Since fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c, f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a, and fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = d, feasibility implies a, c, and d are all
distinct objects. This completes the proof of Claim B.7. 
Claim B.8. cPkd.
Proof of Claim B.8. Assume for contradiction that dRkc. By Claim B.7, this means dPkc. Suppose b = d.
Because dPkc, this implies bPkc. Also, the facts f j(PN) = b, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c, and fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN)
together imply cPjb. However, since cPjb and bPkc, the facts f j(PN) = b and fk(PN) = c together contradict
Pareto efficiency. So, it must be that b 6= d. This, along with Claim B.7, yields that a, b, c, and d are all
distinct objects.
Consider the preference profiles presented in Table B.6. In addition to the structure provided in the











Preference profiles Individual i Individual j Individual k . . . Individual l
P1N P̃i ca . . . dbc . . . . . . Pl
P2N P̃i cba . . . dbc . . . . . . Pl
P3N P̃i ca . . . Pk . . . Pl
P4N P̃i cba . . . Pk . . . Pl
Table B.6: Preference profiles for Claim B.8
The fact f j(PN) = b and (B.5) yield f j(P̃i, P−i) = b. Moreover, the facts f j(PN) = b, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c,




j , P−i,j) 6= c for all P
′
j ∈ L(A). (B.22)
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By strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, the fact f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a and (B.22) imply
f (P3N) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.23)
The fact fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = d and (B.23) imply fk(P
3
N) = d. Since f is strategy-proof and non-bossy, fk(P
3
N) =
d yields f (P1N) = f (P
3
N). This, together with (B.23), implies
f (P1N) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.24)
Similarly, by strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, the fact f j(P̃i, P−i) = b and (B.22) imply f (P
4
N) = f (P̃i,
P−i). This, along with (B.5), yields
f (P4N) = f (PN). (B.25)
Since f j(PN) = b and fk(PN) = c, by (B.25) we have f j(P
4
N) = b and fk(P
4
N) = c. By strategy-proofness,
dPkc and fk(P
4
N) = c together imply fk(P
2
N) ∈ {b, c}. Suppose fk(P
2
N) = c. Since fk(P
2
N) = c and fk(P
4
N) =
c, by non-bossiness and the fact that f j(P
4
N) = b, we have f j(P
2
N) = b. However, f j(P
2
N) = b and fk(P
2
N) = c
together contradict Pareto efficiency. So, it must be that
fk(P
2
N) = b. (B.26)
Since f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a, by (B.24) we have f j(P
1
N) = a. Also, by (B.26) we have f j(P
2
N) 6= b. By strategy-
proofness, the facts f j(P
1
N) = a and f j(P
2
N) 6= b together imply f j(P
2
N) = a. Since f j(P
1
N) = a and f j(P
2
N) =
a, by non-bossiness and (B.24), we have
f (P2N) = f (P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j). (B.27)
However, since fk(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = d, by (B.27) we have fk(P
2
N) = d, a contradiction to (B.26). This
completes the proof of Claim B.8. 
Fix a preference P̂ ∈ L(A \ {a, b, c}) over the objects in A \ {a, b, c}. Consider the preference profiles





31For instance, abcP̂ denotes the preference that ranks a first, b second, c third, and follows P̂ for the ranking of the rest of the
objects.
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Preference profiles Individual i Individual j Individual k . . . Individual l
P1N abcP̂ cabP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P2N abcP̂ cbaP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P3N acbP̂ cabP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P4N acbP̂ cabP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
P5N acbP̂ cabP̂ cd . . . . . . Pl
P6N bcaP̂ cbaP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P7N bcaP̂ cbaP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
P8N cabP̂ cabP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
P9N cabP̂ cbaP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
P10N cabP̂ cabP̂ cd . . . . . . Pl
P11N cabP̂ cbaP̂ cd . . . . . . Pl
P12N cbaP̂ cabP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P13N cbaP̂ cbaP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P14N cbaP̂ cabP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
P15N cbaP̂ cbaP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
Table B.7: Preference profiles for Lemma B.2
The facts f j(PN) = b, fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c, and fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j)Pj f j(PN) together imply cPjb. Since cPjb and
f j(PN) = b, by strategy-proofness, we have
f j(P
′
j , P−j) 6= c for all P
′
j ∈ L(A). (B.28)
Combining the fact f j(PN) = b with (B.5), we have f j(P̃i, P−i) = f j(P̃j, P−j) = b. Since f is strategy-proof,
the facts f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a and f j(P̃i, P−i) = b together imply aR̃jb, which along with Claim B.7, yields
aP̃jb. Since aP̃jb and f j(P̃j, P−j) = b, by strategy-proofness, we have
f j(P
′
j , P−j) 6= a for all P
′
j ∈ L(A). (B.29)
However, since f j(P̃j, P−j) = b, by strategy-proofness and non-bossiness along with (B.28) and (B.29),
we have f (P5j , P−j) = f (P̃j, P−j). By (B.5), this, in particular, means
fi(P
5
j , P−j) = a, f j(P
5
j , P−j) = b, and fk(P
5
j , P−j) = c. (B.30)
By moving the preferences of the individuals l ∈ {i, k} from Pl to P
5
l one by one, and by applying strategy-
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proofness and non-bossiness on (B.30) each time, we conclude
fi(P
5
N) = a, f j(P
5
N) = b, and fk(P
5
N) = c. (B.31)
Using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.31) that
fi(P
4
N) = a, f j(P
4
N) = b, and fk(P
4
N) = c. (B.32)
By strategy-proofness, the facts cPjb and f j(P̃i, P−i) = b together imply
f j(P̃i, P
′
j , P−i,j) 6= c for all P
′
j ∈ L(A). (B.33)
Since f is strategy-proof, the fact f j(P̃i, P−i) = b and (B.33) imply f j(P̃i, P
11
j , P−i,j) = b. Moreover, since
f j(P̃i, P−i) = b and f j(P̃i, P
11
j , P−i,j) = b, by non-bossiness, we have f (P̃i, P
11
j , P−i,j) = f (P̃i, P−i). This,
together with (B.5), yields
f (P̃i, P
11
j , P−i,j) = f (PN). (B.34)
By (B.5) we have fi(PN) = fi(P̃j, P−j). This, along with the fact that fi(PN) = a, yields fi(P̃j, P−j) = a. Since
f is strategy-proof, the facts fi(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = c and fi(P̃j, P−j) = a together imply cR̃ia, which along with
Claim B.7, yields cP̃ia. Also, the fact fi(PN) = a, together with (B.34), implies fi(P̃i, P
11
j , P−i,j) = a. Since
cP̃ia and fi(P̃i, P
11




j , P−i,j) = a. Moreover, since fi(P̃i,








j , P−i,j) = fi(P̃i, P
11
j , P−i,j).













j , P−i,j) = c. (B.35)
Using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.35) that
fi(P
11
N ) = a, f j(P
11
N ) = b, and fk(P
11
N ) = c. (B.36)
Again, using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.36) that
fi(P
9
N) = a, f j(P
9
N) = b, and fk(P
9
N) = c. (B.37)
Since f is strategy-proof, the fact f j(P̃i, P̃j, P−i,j) = a and (B.33) imply f j(P̃i, P
10
j , P−i,j) = a. Since f j(P̃i,
P̃j, P−i,j) = a and f j(P̃i, P
10
j , P−i,j) = a, by non-bossiness, we have f (P̃i, P
10





j , P−i,j) = c, f j(P̃i, P
10
j , P−i,j) = a, and fk(P̃i, P
10
j , P−i,j) = d. (B.38)




k , P−i,j,k) = d.
Moreover, since fk(P̃i, P
10

















k , P−i,j,k) = d. (B.39)
Using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.39) that
fi(P
10
N ) = c, f j(P
10
N ) = a, and fk(P
10
N ) = d. (B.40)
By strategy-proofness, (B.37) implies f j(P
8
N) ∈ {a, b}. Suppose f j(P
8
N) = b. Since f j(P
8
N) = b and
f j(P
9
N) = b, by non-bossiness, (B.37) implies fk(P
8
N) = c. However, since fk(P
8
N) = c, (B.40) contradicts
strategy-proofness. So, it must be that f j(P
8
N) = a. By strategy-proofness, (B.32) implies fi(P
8
N) ∈ {a, c}.
This, along with the fact that f j(P
8
N) = a, yields
fi(P
8
N) = c and f j(P
8
N) = a. (B.41)
Using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.41) that
fi(P
14
N ) = c and f j(P
14
N ) = a. (B.42)
By strategy-proofness, (B.42) implies f j(P
15
N ) ∈ {a, b}. Suppose f j(P
15
N ) = a. Since f j(P
14
N ) = a and
f j(P
15
N ) = a, by non-bossiness and (B.42), we have fi(P
15
N ) = c. However, since fi(P
15
N ) = c, (B.37)
contradicts strategy-proofness. So, it must be that f j(P
15
N ) = b. By strategy-proofness, (B.37) implies
fi(P
15
N ) ∈ {a, b}. This, along with the fact that f j(P
15
N ) = b, yields fi(P
15




N ) = a, f j(P
15
N ) = b, and fk(P
15
N ) = c. (B.43)
Using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.43) that
fi(P
7
N) = a, f j(P
7
N) = b, and fk(P
7
N) = c. (B.44)
By (B.42) we have fk(P
14
N ) /∈ {a, c}. By strategy-proofness, the fact fk(P
14






N ). This, by non-bossiness and (B.42), implies
fi(P
12
N ) = c and f j(P
12
N ) = a. (B.45)
By strategy-proofness, (B.45) implies fi(P
3
N) ∈ {a, c}. Suppose fi(P
3
N) = c. Since fi(P
12
N ) = c and fi(P
3
N) =
c, by non-bossiness and (B.45), we have f j(P
3
N) = a. However, fi(P
3
N) = c and f j(P
3
N) = a together
contradict Pareto efficiency. So, it must be that fi(P
3
N) = a. By strategy-proofness, (B.31) implies fk(P
3
N) ∈
{a, c}. This, along with the fact that fi(P
3
N) = a, yields
fi(P
3
N) = a and fk(P
3
N) = c. (B.46)
Using strategy-proofness and non-bossiness, we obtain from (B.46) that
fi(P
1
N) = a and fk(P
1
N) = c. (B.47)
By (B.47) we have f j(P
1
N) /∈ {a, c}. By strategy-proofness, f j(P
1
N) /∈ {a, c} implies f j(P
2
N) = f j(P
1
N). This,
by non-bossiness and (B.47), implies
fi(P
2
N) = a and fk(P
2
N) = c. (B.48)
By (B.43) we have fi(P
15
N ) = a and fk(P
15
N ) = c. By strategy-proofness, fk(P
15
N ) = c implies fk(P
13
N ) ∈ {a,
c}. Suppose fk(P
13
N ) = c. Since fk(P
15
N ) = c and fk(P
13
N ) = c, by non-bossiness and the fact that fi(P
15
N ) = a,
we have fi(P
13
N ) = a. However, fi(P
13
N ) = a and fk(P
13
N ) = c together contradict Pareto efficiency. So, it
must be that fk(P
13
N ) = a. By strategy-proofness, (B.45) implies f j(P
13
N ) ∈ {a, b}. This, along with the
fact that fk(P
13
N ) = a, yields f j(P
13
N ) = b. By strategy-proofness, (B.48) implies fi(P
13
N ) ∈ {a, b, c}. This,
together with the facts that f j(P
13
N ) = b and fk(P
13
N ) = a, implies
fi(P
13
N ) = c, f j(P
13
N ) = b, and fk(P
13
N ) = a. (B.49)
By strategy-proofness, (B.44) implies fk(P
6
N) ∈ {a, c}. Suppose fk(P
6
N) = c. Since fk(P
7
N) = c and
fk(P
6
N) = c, by non-bossiness and (B.44), we have fi(P
6
N) = a. However, fi(P
6
N) = a and fk(P
6
N) = c
together contradict Pareto efficiency. So, it must be that fk(P
6
N) = a. Also, by (B.49) we have fi(P
13
N ) = c
and f j(P
13
N ) = b. By strategy-proofness, fi(P
13
N ) = c implies fi(P
6
N) ∈ {b, c}. Suppose fi(P
6
N) = c. Since
fi(P
13
N ) = c and fi(P
6
N) = c, by non-bossiness and the fact that f j(P
13
N ) = b, we have f j(P
6
N) = b. However,
fi(P
6
N) = c and f j(P
6
N) = b together contradict Pareto efficiency. So, it must be that fi(P
6
N) = b. Combining
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the facts that fi(P
6
N) = b and fk(P
6
N) = a, we have
fi(P
6
N) = b and fk(P
6
N) = a. (B.50)
Now we complete the proof of Lemma B.2. Consider the restricted domain P̃N ⊆ L
n(A) with only
three preference profiles as follows.
Preference profiles Individual i Individual j Individual k . . . Individual l
P6N bcaP̂ cbaP̂ acbP̂ . . . Pl
P7N bcaP̂ cbaP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
P14N cbaP̂ cabP̂ cabP̂ . . . Pl
Table B.8: Preference profiles of P̃N
By (B.42), (B.44), and (B.50), we have
Preference profiles fi(PN) f j(PN) fk(PN)
P6N b a
P7N a b c
P14N c a
Table B.9: Partial outcome of f on P̃N
Since f is OSP-implementable on Ln(A), it must be OSP-implementable on the restricted domain P̃N .
Let G̃ be an OSP mechanism that implements f on P̃N .
Note that since f (P6N) 6= f (P
7
N), there exists a node in the OSP mechanism G̃ that has at least two
edges. Also, note that since each individual l ∈ N \ {i, j, k} has exactly one preference in P̃l , whenever
there are at least two outgoing edges from a node, that node must be assigned to some individual in
{i, j, k}. Consider the first node (from the root) v that has two edges.
Suppose ηNI(v) = i. Consider the preference profiles P7N and P
14
N . Note that both of them pass through
the node v at which P7i and P
14




N) = a, and fi(P
14
N ) = c. However,
the facts that cP7i a, fi(P
7
N) = a, and fi(P
14
N ) = c together contradict OSP-implementability of f on P̃N . So,
it must be that ηNI(v) 6= i.
Suppose ηNI(v) = k. Consider the preference profiles P6N and P
14
N . Note that both of them pass through
the node v at which P6k and P
14
k diverge. Further note that fk(P
6
N) = a, fk(P
14
N ) /∈ {a, c}, and aP
14
k x for all
x ∈ A \ {a, c}. Since aP14k x for all x ∈ A \ {a, c}, the facts that fk(P
6
N) = a and fk(P
14
N ) /∈ {a, c} together
contradict OSP-implementability of f on P̃N . So, it must be that η
NI(v) 6= k.
Since ηNI(v) 6= i and ηNI(v) 6= k, it must be that ηNI(v) = j. We distinguish the following two cases.
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CASE 1: f j(P
6
N) = c.
Consider the preference profiles P6N and P
14
N . Note that both of them pass through the node v at which
P6j and P
14
j diverge. Further note that cP
14
j a, f j(P
6
N) = c, and f j(P
14





N) = c, and f j(P
14
N ) = a together contradict OSP-implementability of f on P̃N .
CASE 2: f j(P
6
N) 6= c.
Consider the preference profiles P6N and P
14
N . Note that both of them pass through the node v at which
P6j and P
14
j diverge. Further note that f j(P
6
N) /∈ {a, b, c}, f j(P
14
N ) = a, and aP
6
j x for all x ∈ A \ {a, b, c}.
Since aP6j x for all x ∈ A \ {a, b, c}, the facts that f j(P
6
N) /∈ {a, b, c} and f j(P
14
N ) = a together contradict
OSP-implementability of f on P̃N . This completes the proof of Lemma B.2. 
B.3 Completion of the proof of Theorem 7.1
We present two results from Pápai (2000), which we use to complete the proof of Theorem 7.1.
Theorem B.1 (Main theorem in Pápai (2000)). An assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is group strategy-proof,
Pareto efficient, and reallocation-proof if and only if f is a hierarchical exchange rule.
Lemma B.3 (Lemma 1 in Pápai (2000)). An assignment rule f : Ln(A) → M is group strategy-proof if and
only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. (If part) Let f be a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying dual ownership. By Lemma
B.1, f is OSP-implementable. Moreover, since f is a hierarchical exchange rule, by Theorem B.1, f is group
strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. The fact that f is group strategy-proof along with Lemma B.3, implies
f is non-bossy. This completes the proof of the “if“ part of Theorem 7.1.
(Only-if part) Let f be an OSP-implementable, non-bossy, and Pareto efficient assignment rule. By
Lemma B.2, f is reallocation-proof. Since f is OSP-implementable, by Remark 4.1, f is strategy-proof.
This, together with Lemma B.3 and the fact that f is non-bossy, implies f is group strategy-proof. Since
f is group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and reallocation-proof, by Theorem B.1, f is a hierarchical ex-
change rule. Moreover, since f is an OSP-implementable hierarchical exchange rule, by Lemma B.1, f is
a hierarchical exchange rule satisfying dual ownership. This completes the proof of the “only-if“ part of
Theorem 7.1. 
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 10.1
Proof of Proposition 10.1. (If part) Suppose Γ is acyclic. Assume for contradiction that ≻̂A contains a pri-
ority cycle, say [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)]. By the definition of priority cycle, this means one of the following
two statements must hold.
(1) τ(≻̂xh) = ih for all h = 1, 2, 3.
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(2) There exist distinct individuals i4, . . . , it ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3} and distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x1, x2,
x3} such that for all h = 1, . . . , t, we have U(ih,≻xh) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}.
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose (1) holds.
Since ≻̂A is induced by Γ, the fact that τ(≻̂xh) = ih for all h = 1, 2, 3 implies i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to
the root-nodes of Γx1 , Γx2 , and Γx3 , respectively. So, it must be that [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is an inheritance
cycle at Γ, a contradiction to the fact Γ is acyclic.
CASE 2: Suppose (2) holds.
Consider the restriction of the priority structure ≻̂A to the submarket consisting of {i4, . . . , it} and {x4,
. . . , xt}. Let µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}) be the allocation such that µ̂(ih) = xh for all h = 4, . . . , t. Let
ˆ̂µ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}) be the outcome of TTC procedure (note that here the roles of individuals
and objects are interchanged) at this restricted priority structure (in the submarket consisting of {i4, . . . , it}
and {x4, . . . , xt}) with respect to the initial endowments corresponding to µ̂. Since U(ih,≻xh) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it}
for all h = 4, . . . , t, we have (for details see Roth and Postlewaite (1977))


(a) for all h = 4, . . . , t, we have ˆ̂µ(xh)̂xh ih, and
(b) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, ii ≻̂xj ˆ̂µ(xj) implies ˆ̂µ(xi) ≻̂xi ij.

 (C.1)
Since Γ satisfies the priority property, ≻̂A is induced by Γ, and U(ih,≻xh) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it} for all h = 1, . . . , t,
(C.1) implies that there exists a collection of root-paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t} satisfying the following properties.
(i) (a) For all h = 1, 2, 3, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual ih and the other individuals
in πxh are from the set {i4, . . . , it}. For all h = 4, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path πxh is
individual ˆ̂µ(xh) and the other individuals in πxh are from the set {i4, . . . , it}.
(b) For all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths in
(πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̂(ih) is assigned to that edge.
(ii) For all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path πxj ,
then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi .
Construct {j1, . . . , jt} ⊆ N as follows. For all h = 1, 2, 3, let jh = ih. For all h = 4, . . . , t, let jh = ˆ̂µ(xh).
Since ˆ̂µ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}), by the construction of {j1, . . . , jt}, it follows that {j4, . . . , jt} = {i4,
. . . , it}. This, together with the fact that µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}), implies µ̂ ∈ M({j4, . . . , jt},
{x4, . . . , xt}). Since {j4, . . . , jt} = {i4, . . . , it} and µ̂ ∈ M({j4, . . . , jt}, {x4, . . . , xt}), by the construction of
{j1, . . . , jt}, along with the properties of the collection of root-paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, we obtain the following
facts.
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(i) (a) For all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual jh and the other individ-
uals in πxh are from the set {j4, . . . , jt}.
(b) For all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual jh in any of the root-paths in
(πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̂(jh) is assigned to that edge.
(ii) For all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path πxj ,
then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi .
These facts imply that [(j1, j2, j3), (x1, x2, x3)] is an inheritance cycle at Γ, a contradiction to the fact that
Γ is acyclic. This completes the proof of the “if“ part of Proposition 10.1.
(Only-if part) Suppose ≻̂A is acyclic. Assume for contradiction that Γ contains an inheritance cycle,
say [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)]. By the definition of inheritance cycle, this means one of the following two
statements must hold.
(1) Individuals i1, i2, and i3 are assigned to the root-nodes of Γx1 , Γx2 , and Γx3 , respectively.
(2) There exist distinct individuals i4, . . . , it ∈ N \ {i1, i2, i3}, distinct objects x4, . . . , xt ∈ A \ {x1, x2, x3},
an allocation µ̂ ∈ M({i4, . . . , it}, {x4, . . . , xt}), and a collection of root-paths (πxh)h∈{1,...,t} with the
properties that
(i) (a) for all h = 1, . . . , t, the last element of the root-path πxh is individual ih and the other
individuals in πxh are from the set {i4, . . . , it},
(b) for all h = 4, . . . , t, if there is an (outgoing) edge from individual ih in any of the root-paths
in (πxh)h∈{1,...,t}, then object µ̂(ih) is assigned to that edge, and
(ii) for all distinct objects xi, xj ∈ {x4, . . . , xt}, if individual µ̂(xi) lies in the interior of the root-path
πxj , then individual µ̂(xj) does not lie in the root-path πxi .
We distinguish the following two cases.
CASE 1: Suppose (1) holds.
Since ≻̂A is induced by Γ, the fact that individual ih is assigned to the root-node of Γxh for all h = 1, 2, 3
implies τ(≻̂xh) = ih for all h = 1, 2, 3. This implies that [(i1, i2, i3), (x1, x2, x3)] is a priority cycle at ≻̂A, a
contradiction to the fact that ≻̂A is acyclic.
CASE 2: Suppose (2) holds.
Since Γ satisfies the priority property and ≻̂A is induced by Γ, by the construction of ≻̂A and the
assumption of Case 2, we have U(ih,≻xh) ⊆ {i4, . . . , it} for all h = 1, . . . , t. This implies that [(i1, i2, i3),
(x1, x2, x3)] is a priority cycle at ≻̂A, a contradiction to the fact that ≻̂A is acyclic. This completes the proof
of the “only-if“ part of Proposition 10.1. 
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[5] Avinatan Hassidim, Déborah Marciano, Assaf Romm, and Ran I Shorrer. The mechanism is truthful,
why aren’t you? American Economic Review, 107(5):220–24, 2017.
[6] Shengwu Li. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. American Economic Review, 107(11):3257–87,
2017.
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